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Abstract
The rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement reaffirmed, with certainty, that the
international community would continue its efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and
adapt to climate change impacts opening a new era of international cooperation on climate
change. This thesis explores how both negotiations around climate change adaptation and
adaptation project implementation have evolved in this post-Paris Agreement era (from adoption
in December 2015 to present). Using the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change’s (UNFCCC) Adaptation Fund as the central lens, the chapters explore international
negotiations around the Fund as well as two Adaptation Fund funded projects—one in Nicaragua
and the second in Samoa. This research which traverses the levels of governance from
international to local prompts an examination of how exactly adaptation stakeholders and
institutions work across and between governance levels and scales. Thus, the framework of
multi-level governance is used as a way to unpack the interactions and structures involved in the
Adaptation Fund and its funded projects.

At the international level negotiations around the Adaptation Fund, we find that
developing countries use the Adaptation Fund as a tool to defend justice-based norms in a
UNFCCC system that has rapidly transition to a more liberal-based norm structure with the
introduction of the Paris Agreement. Developing countries' ardent and almost unanimous support
for the continuation of the Adaptation Fund under the Paris Agreement throughout the duration
of the negotiating process (2015-2018) provides insights into their efforts to defend and promote
justice-based norms. We explore how this unwavering support for the Adaptation Fund could
impact Fund structures, operations, and on-the-ground project implementation (looking to the
national and sub-national levels).
We then trace the Adaptation Fund from negotiations to project implementation. These
projects inherently present a multi-level governance challenge because they are developed at the
national level, funded and monitored at the international level, and ultimately implemented in
communities. It is well understood that these levels of governance exist and function within this
overall system of climate adaptation. However, the synergies that facilitate effective adaptation
and the barriers that inhibit smooth multi-level governance of adaptation are not well understood
in the literature. Chapter 3 and 4 presents evidence from Adaptation Fund projects in Samoa and
Nicaragua to highlight areas where multi-level governance had been leveraged to enhance the
governance of adaptation as well as areas of the projects where this has not occurred. They
further examine the trade-offs inherent in efforts to work across governance scales and levels in
conducting climate adaptation.
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CHAPTER 1
THESIS INTRODUCTION
Current state of the international adaptation conversation
Buzzwords abound in the world of climate change policy research and practice. At
United Nations climate change negotiating sessions, catchy words and phrases ranging from “we
are all in the same canoe” to “transformational change” reverberate across panel introductions
and 3-minute plenary hall intervention with the intent to convey a concise and consistent
message. While these are key communication and political strategy tools, they are rarely clearly
defined once you start searching for the details. Yet, some of these buzzwords still become
integrated into substantial international decisions.
Transformational adaptation is among the most recent wave of phrases evoked in the
halls of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) annual
Conference of the Parties (COP). The idea of transformational adaptation builds from climate
adaptation which is generally understood as “adjustments in ecological, social, or economic
systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts”
(UNFCCC 2019). Transformational adaptation is used as a rallying call to increase funding and
scale up projects for adaptation, and it has also been integrated into language of the major
UNFCCC funding mechanisms—the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Adaptation Fund,
and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C
highlights that, in some regions, incremental adaptation will not sufficiently address impacts, so
“transformational adaptation would then be required” (2018).
In the literature, transformational climate adaptation has been juxtaposed with coping or
reactive adaptation and incremental adaptation. Coping is defined as reactionary steps to
decrease vulnerability to impacts that have occurred (Chhetri et al. 2019). For example,
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individual subsistence farmers deepening their wells during times of extended drought until they
reach water. This effort is not a long-term solution and it does not address the root of the
problem, but it does allow them to have water for the household and crops in the immediate
future. Incremental adaptation is considered to be changes made within the context of the
existing system (Kates et al. 2012). In this case, farmers might work together and with other
regional stakeholders to come up with a water strategy that might include increasing capacity to
catch and hold rainwater in tanks and introduce more efficient irrigation systems for crops.
In contrast, transformational adaptation aims to change the system rather than work
within its current bounds (Richards and Howden 2012 in Chhetri et al. 2019). Transformational
adaptations are “those that are adopted at a much larger scale or intensity, those that are truly
new to a particular region or resource system, and those that transform places and shift locations”
(Kates et al. 2012, 7156). In the example of the farmers dealing with drought, transformational
adaptation may include subsistence farmers completely changing the crops they grow in favor of
new crops better suited to the new climate conditions, farmers relocating to an area more suited
for their crops, and/or the government implementing country-wide regulations on water or on
industrial farm’s water and land use.
However, how these different forms of adaptations interact and the distinctions between
them are not well defined. When does something change from being incremental to
transformational? How is transformation measured and what are its outcomes? Are coping,
incremental, and transformational adaptation discrete or continuous? So, while the end goal of
transformation has been articulated by UN delegates and multilateral climate funding
mechanisms alike, the paths to transformational outcomes are murky at best. At present,
definitions of what exactly constitutes transformational climate adaptation are being
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conceptualized and simultaneously tested as billions of dollars are distributed each year for
climate adaptation projects around the world.
Since transformational adaptation is a growing focus of the adaptation funding
community, it is particularly important to consider in the context of internationally funded
projects implemented in developing countries—the priority of the UNFCCC funding
mechanisms. Internationally funded climate adaptation projects add layers of complexity to
transformational adaptation because of the structures and expectations established at the
international level. A central question about the push for transformational adaptation from the
UNFCCC funding mechanisms is, does this form of adaptation encourage top-down adaptation
focused on national and international actors who then dictate the system change to the subnational level? It is easy to see transformational adaptation as the role of the national and
international level because transformation is defined as system change at scale. For example,
new national policy, relocation, or reshaping norms might all ultimately happen at the national
level in order to reach a threshold of actual system change. Further, the current dominant funding
arrangements, in which international funds are funneled to national government, could reinforce
a focus on national level centered transformational adaptation.
Yet, a long history of international development funding and projects demonstrate that
this is an insufficient approach (Adams 2009). So, if transformational adaptation is the focus of
international climate project funders, it is imperative to explore how they can support
transformative adaptation that revisits power dynamics to address root vulnerabilities rather than
entrench top-down systems (Bahadur and Tanner 2014, Eriksen et al. 2016). Further, how do the
projects intentionally involve stakeholders at the sub-national level in the transformation
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process? Eriksen et al. (2016, 529) argues that these decisions will either “open up or close down
space for transformational adaptation.”
Multi-level governance of climate change adaptation
An emerging theme from the literature is that governance impacts the processes or paths
to transformational adaptation (Pelling et al. 2015). Park et al. (2012) indicate that incremental or
transformational adaptation initiated at one level will likely be dependent on what is happening
at other governance levels. Chhetri et al. (2019) suggests that multiple jurisdictional levels of
governance must be involved in transformational adaptation from the local to the international
level. Many case studies in the literature highlight that different scales and levels were involved
in the making of both incremental and transformational adaptation (Hadarits et al. 2017, Ripple
et al. 2016), but these efforts did not seem to be deliberate.
This thesis argues that intentional and strategic multi-level governance may be a critical
tool for effective implementation of internationally-funded climate adaptation projects. Multilevel governance is conceived as each level of governance constantly interacting with the others
in order to function effectively, but at the same time, independently making decisions and
implementing policy (Cole 2011, Keskitalo 2010, Ostrom 2012, Stephenson 2013). As a
prerequisite to building a further understanding of transformational adaptation—the current focus
of advocates and funders—we must first understand the systems that exist now and the extent to
which they embrace or set a side governance which includes stakeholders and institutions across
levels and scales.
Multi-level governance is cited as particularly valuable in situations where “there will be
limits to adaptation and a need for more fundamental shifts in strategy that require new ideas and
practices” (Olsson et al. in Armitage and Plummer 2010) because it creates channels of
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communication and coordinated efforts that facilitate knowledge sharing, dispute resolution, and
increased adaptive capacity (Berkes 2009). This thesis explores two case studies of adaptation
projects to understand the extent to which multi-level governance is intentionally used as well as
the resulting outcomes in an effort to inform this broader conversation about the ways that this
form of governance can be applied to internationally-funded climate change adaptation projects.
Specifically, the case studies (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) examine the extent to which
power, resources, and decision-making capabilities are shared across levels and scales. While
many international sustainable development projects have demonstrated an ability to share
project responsibilities across jurisdictional levels (i.e., tell local governments to manage project
installation, give the responsibility of project monitoring to community groups, outsource project
oversight to a multilateral organization), there are far fewer examples that achieve distribution of
power, especially away from the national government. This analysis explicitly looks to find
where power (in the form of money, decision-making power, and inclusion in the duration of the
project) is distributed and the actions that distributed power facilitates.
The significant push for transformational adaptation demands a path to get there, and
multi-level governance may be one important piece in the puzzle to build into this path.
Thesis overview
The thesis focuses around the UNFCCC’s Adaptation Fund. The Adaptation Fund is a
small funding mechanism which aims to support concrete adaptation projects in regions of
developing countries highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The Adaptation Fund is
a useful tool to study multi-level governance because it was created by countries working
together at the international level and has a Board which functions at the international level. The
Fund works with national level governments to support projects, and it has also pioneered ways
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to work more directly with sub-national entities within countries. With most projects, the
national government received the funding and implements the project in communities at the local
level. The projects are then monitored and reported on back to the international level while the
local level holds the long-term responsibility for project sustainability.
In Chapter 2, I examine the international negotiations around the Adaptation Fund at the
UNFCCC. Looking at all major negotiating sessions since the Paris Agreement, this chapter
paints a picture of the Adaptation Fund’s challenges and opportunities in this new era of
international climate cooperation. In particular, the chapter looks at how developing countries
use the Adaptation Fund as a tool to promote justice-based norms in an internationally system
that has increasingly shifted to liberal-based norms. The embeddedness of justice-based norms in
the Adaptation Fund implies that countries would also require its governance to be inclusive and
participatory. This sets the stage for exploring the extent to which this transcends the levels of
governance in Chapters 3 and 4. We ask the question, do adaptation projects actually share
power, resources, and decision-making authority across levels (i.e., evoking justice-based norms)
or do they devolve disempowered responsibility?
Chapter 3 takes a deep dive into multi-level governance and provides a categorization of
features of multi-level governance present in the adaptation literature. Then, I look at two
country-wide adaptation initiatives in Samoa, funded by the Adaptation Fund and the World
Bank respectively, to examine the extent to which these features are apparent in the projects. The
chapter concludes by discussing the trade-offs inherent in a multi-level governance system.
Chapter 4 discusses an Adaptation Fund project in Nicaragua which aimed to decrease
the impacts of flooding and drought in a section of the country’s dry corridor. This chapter
explores aspects of the Nicaragua project through the lens of multi-level governance with a
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particular focus on understanding stakeholders’ perceptions of the project’s impact and learning
to what extent the project catalyzed further adaptation efforts in the region as planned in the
project proposal. Since the majority of Adaptation Fund projects are still in process, the
completed Nicaragua project provides a first sense of post-project sustainability.
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CHAPTER 2
SAVING THE ADAPTATION FUND: ON THE EVOLVING POLITICS OF CLIMATE
ADAPTATION FINANCE UNDER THE UNFCCC
Abstract
The rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement reaffirmed, with certainty, that the
international community would continue its efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and
adapt to climate change impacts. Yet, structures created under the Kyoto Protocol, like the
Adaptation Fund, were left in a state of unprecedented ambiguity because parties had to actively
approve the continuation of these structures under the Paris Agreement, or risk seeing them fade
into UNFCCC history. This juncture presented a unique window to explore the political
economy of climate change finance—how countries and negotiating blocs reacted to and shaped
a narrative of the Adaptation Fund’s uncertain future. Drawing on narrative political analysis of
negotiating texts and observations at COP meetings, we find that developing countries use the
Adaptation Fund as a tool to defend justice-based norms in a UNFCCC system that has rapidly
transition to a more liberal-based norm structure with the introduction of the Paris Agreement.
Developing countries' ardent and almost unanimous support for the continuation of the
Adaptation Fund under the Paris Agreement throughout the duration of the negotiating process
(2015-2018) provides insights into their efforts to defend and promote justice-based norms. We
explore how this unwavering support for the Adaptation Fund could impact Fund structures,
operations, and on-the-ground project implementation. This chapter has been revised and
resubmitted to the journal Global Environmental Politics with Dr. Cindy Isenhour as a co-author.
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Introduction
Institutional norms and the political economy of climate change finance
The planet has already warmed approximately 1.0°C above pre-industrial levels (IPCC
2018). More warming is anticipated, even if all countries act upon their Paris Agreement
mitigation commitments. While climate change adaptation had historically been seen a minor
consideration when compared to mitigation, countries leaders are now framing adaptation as
urgent and essential in light of the warming and resulting climate impacts already occurring
around the world. Approaches to adaptation are as diverse as the regions impacted by climate
change. Yet, increasingly many adaptation actions, especially in developing countries,1 are
influenced by international funders providing support for climate adaptation projects. Many of
these funds stem, either directly or indirectly, from United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations.
Given the UNFCCC’s role in shaping global adaptation goals and rhetoric, it is important
to explore the processes which ultimately produce these outcomes. The Paris Agreement and the
negotiation of its rulebook warrant particular attention because they have become a central frame
through which to view climate action across countries. The adoption of the Paris Agreement
rocked the historic format of international agreements on climate change. Rather than focusing
on commitments from industrialized, developed countries, the Paris Agreement draws on
country-specific commitments from every member country. In doing so, countries moved away
from the UNFCCC’s tenant of differentiation, and towards liberalization following in a lineage
of global environmental agreements that have embraced neoliberal reforms (Ciplet and Roberts

1

The language of “developing country” and “developed country” is used throughout the article to mirror, not
endorse, the language used under the UNFCCC.
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2016). These neoliberal reforms tend to more equally distribute the responsibility for addressing
climate change across countries regardless of actual responsibility for causing the problem.
As Ciplet and Roberts (2016) highlight, this shift towards neoliberal norms did not occur
without contestation. In this context of broad sweeping liberalization across international
environmental institutions, this article examines the Adaptation Fund under the UNFCCC which
appears to be one of the last enclaves where developing countries are working to defend more
justice-based norms against the full integration of neoliberal reforms. This makes negotiations
around adaptation finance some of the most contentious under the UNFCCC (Moore 2012).
Adaptation finance and the Adaptation Fund
The Adaptation Fund was established in 2001 by the leadership of developing countries
under the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol (Richards and Schalatek and 2017). The Adaptation Fund
is charged with “financing projects and programmes that help vulnerable communities in
developing countries adapt to climate change...based on country needs, views, and priorities”
(Adaptation Fund 2018). While intensely debated, as this paper will demonstrate, the Adaptation
Fund only represents a small sliver of overall climate finance. Significant international funding
has been allocated to climate change projects for over 25 years (Figure 1). Since 1992, the
Global Environment Facility (GEF) has funded over 1,600 projects with a climate change focus
(GEF 2019). The Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010, represents the most recent
effort under the UNFCCC to accumulate and distribute funding for climate mitigation and
adaptation projects in developing countries. The global finance goal for the GCF is US$100
billion per year by 2020, and, as of April 2019, the GCF boasted over US$2 billion of funding
currently supporting project implementation (GCF 2019).
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In December 2018, the World Bank Group announced that it would increase its direct
adaptation climate finance to US$50 billion between 2021 and 2025 which represents a two-fold
increase relative to the adaptation funding they distributed from 2015 to 2018. The World Bank
Group also announced that every project proposal, regardless of sector or region, must include
climate change considerations in order to receive their funding (World Bank 2019). In addition
to multilateral financing, the European Union, EU member countries, and the European
Investment Bank collectively contributed EUR 20.4 billion towards public climate financing for
developing countries in 2017 alone (European Commission nd). The landscape of climate
finance is vast and on an upward trajectory.

Figure 1: Funding pledged to some of the major climate funds since their inception with the exception of GEF which
only shows GEF 5 and 6. The dark blue bars represent funds that support just adaptation. The light blue bars are
funds that support both adaptation and mitigation or mitigation only. Figure is adapted from World Resources
Institute (2017) which based data on GCF 2016, GEF 2014, and World Bank 2016.

Despite all of these powerhouse funds, the Adaptation Fund has also carved out a niche in
the international climate finance architecture. The Fund is small by comparison with about 90
projects funded over a 10-year period and between US$10-60 million allocated towards new
projects at each quarterly meeting between June 2014 and July 2018 (Grimm et al. 2018).
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Despite its relatively modest funding capacity, developing countries at UNFCCC negotiations
associate significant value with the Adaptation Fund.
As the Fund approached 10 years of financing ‘concrete’ adaptation projects, it was
propelled into uncertainty by a Paris Agreement decision that opened the continuation of the
Fund up for debate at future negotiations. This article documents the significant efforts of
developing countries to “save” the Adaptation Fund and ensure its continuation under the Paris
Agreement. While the Adaptation Fund is a relatively small piece of the total climate adaptation
finance landscape, developing country delegates spent considerable time, effort, and political
capital defending the Fund—an expenditure that could be seen as disproportionate to the
financing provided. These efforts could certainly be seen as irrational; and thus, raise questions
about why delegates would exert so much effort on a Fund that promises relatively few
economic returns. Studies of international climate negotiations have long been dominated by
rationalist theories which assume that state actors engage in cost-benefit analyses to inform
competitive behaviors intended to maximize utility through negotiations. However, we argue that
rationalist perspectives—already critiqued on empirical and theoretical grounds (Dorsch &
Flachsland 2017, Edenhofer et al. 2015, Stevenson 2013, Moore 2012)—offer limited insight
into developing country efforts to save the Adaptation Fund.
By contrast, this article fuses political economic and constructivist approaches. This
orientation understands efforts to save the Adaptation Fund as both a reflection of structural
inequalities in the global political economy and as a related effort by the Fund’s proponents to
defend normative structures linked to justice.
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Theoretical framing
Institutional norms
Constructivist scholars have argued that studies of global environmental politics need to
ask more questions about how problems are framed and by whom (Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016)
as well as how these framings help to establish, reproduce, or defend norms in global
environmental politics (Moore 2012). Norms, considered the standard acceptable set of
behaviors in a given context, become deeply embedded in systems, and are, therefore, important
to understand because they shape the possible dynamics between actors. Recognizing that norms
are not interpreted in identical ways by all actors, we can learn about the evolution of global
environmental policy by attending to their framing and contestation. Asking how some norms
become institutionalized in fields of power while others fade away is instructive.
This article focuses specifically on the idea of justice-based norms under the UNFCCC.
As described by Lebel et al. (2017) and Ciplet et al. (2013), the UNFCCC established an initial
structure to support justice considerations in addressing climate change (i.e., common but
differentiated responsibility, historic responsibility, respective capacity). A justice lens2, defined
as “the moral permissibility of a distribution of benefits and burdens,” allows the consideration
of how responsibility for climate change ought to be addressed without the influence of dominant
politics and power structures (Grasso 2010, 29). Maintaining justice-based norms in the
UNFCCC negotiations, specifically on adaptation finance, is the idea of ensuring that developing
countries, that are not responsible for the problem and that are already disproportionately
impacted by it, do not also end up with the burden of paying for adaptation and mitigation.

2

It should be acknowledged that this conceptualization of justice is rooted in Western philosophical tradition and is
used because its principles are most widely applied within the UNFCCC processes (which may be an issue of justice
in it of itself) (Grasso 2010).
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The negotiation and adoption of the Paris Agreement can be seen as the most recent wave
of norm defining and refining under the UNFCCC. Several scholars have noted that the Paris
Agreement prioritization of voluntary but universal action was based more centrally on liberal,
rather than justice-based norms (Ciplet and Roberts 2016). Specifically, all countries are now
responsible for mitigation commitments, instead of just the countries historically responsible for
the causing the problem (i.e., developed, industrialized countries). The migration away from
justice-based imperatives is also demonstrated by developed countries unwillingness to fulfill
their funding obligations on mitigation or adaptation—chiefly the US$100 billion pledged to the
Green Climate Fund in Copenhagen in 2009. This represents the essence of deeply entrenched
trust issues between developed and developing countries in the context of the UNFCCC
negotiations.
Despite an overall shift away from justice-based norms, Adaptation Fund negotiators
continue to evoke justice as a main frame through which to understand differences around the
Fund. Throughout the Fund’s history, it has been at the center of this debate. For example, at SBI
24 in May 2006, Grasso (2010) describes a negotiating session on the Adaptation Fund in which
the G77 and China emphasize “their determination to insist on every possible occasion that they
must be included in decision-making on sensitive issues and have their positions acknowledged”
(Grasso 2010, 108). This represented a demand for inclusion of “fairness criterion” in the process
and decisions (Grasso 2010, 108). As Moore writes, “adaptation is an area of policy closely
related to the questions of justice and fairness raised by the uneven distribution of climate change
impacts and responsibility for the problem. As such, it offers an ideal opportunity to study the
process of norm selection and evolution in international climate change policy” (2012, 33). As
the Adaptation Fund is reconfigured under the Paris Agreement, we note a particularly opportune
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moment to understand how justice-based norms are articulated, negotiated, and institutionalized
during a time of rapid change.
Political economy
Political economic approaches also draw our attention to the political field within which
these negotiations take place. Justice-based norms have long played a part in global
environmental politics, and particularly in the UNFCCC. Norms linked to common but
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) are embedded in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC (Grasso
2010, Lebel et al. 2017). Despite the dominant narrative of CBDR across the UNFCCC, it does
not settle negotiations around adaptation finance—namely who provides adaptation finance; how
are involved institutions structured and governed; and how are specific projects implemented,
monitored, and evaluated?
The inherent political nature of and unsettled norms around climate adaptation finance
are fueled by a history of stark power and resource differentials between developing countries—
only in a position to request money—and developed countries—largely in control of the money
and decision-making about fund expenditures. This power differential is baked into the political
economy of international climate negotiations (Stevenson 2013). Drawing on Newell and
Paterson's (1998) conceptualization of the political and economic dynamics that shape countries’
negotiating positions, this article contributes to our understanding of the political economy of
climate adaptation finance through an examination of “the process by which ideas, power and
resources are conceptualized, negotiated, and implemented” by the parties negotiating the
continuation of the Adaptation Fund since the Paris Agreement (Tanner and Allouche 2011, 1).
Ultimately, while what happens to the Adaptation Fund might have minimal
repercussions on the overall climate finance landscape, we argue that the debate has significant
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implications for understanding the ongoing role of justice-based norms in adaptation finance and
the newest wave of tensions between developed and developing nations as liberal norms become
more prevalent in the post-Paris Agreement era.
In the following sections, we describe a short history of the Adaptation Fund. Then, we
unpack the Paris Agreement decision on the Adaptation Fund in 2015 and trace the evolution of
the UNFCCC negotiations on the Adaptation Fund from 2015 to 2018. Next, we analyze
developing and developed country reasoning behind their positioning on the Fund. The article
then explores the impacts of international norm development and developing-developed country
dynamics on next steps for the Adaptation Fund in the Paris Agreement era.
Background
A brief history of the Adaptation Fund
In 2001, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) organized to form a negotiating bloc
based on the need to secure more support for adaptation under the UNFCCC (Ciplet et al 2013).
At COP7 in Marrakech, the LDCs successfully pushed for the creation of the Least Developed
Countries Fund (LDCF), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and the Adaptation Fund.
While the donor countries largely had control over how the LDCF and the SCCF would be
structured and housed, they had less control over the Adaptation Fund. This is primarily because
the Adaptation Fund was to be partially funded by share of proceeds from the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), not directly from developed countries’ donations. Developing
countries felt real ownership over the CDM funds because they came from mitigation projects
implemented in developing countries (Muller 2007). Additionally, because the Adaptation Fund
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was created under the Kyoto Protocol, which the US never ratified, the US did not have a strong
voice in the development of the Fund3 (Ciplet et al 2013).
Developing countries leveraged their relative power via negotiating blocs including the
LDC group and the G77 and China bloc to have a say in the formation of the institutional
structures and governance of the Adaptation Fund. As Ciplet et al (2013) describe, developing
countries ensured that the Board would have a majority representation from developing
countries, they established the idea of direct access, and they emphasized Fund transparency. Ten
of sixteen Adaptation Fund Board members must be from developing countries, and, within
those 10, there are reserved seats for members of the LDCs and the small island developing
states (SIDS) (Lebel et al 2017). They also emphasized the need for social and environmental
safeguards to ensure that projects supported by the Fund are not causing inadvertent harm to the
communities or environment in which they take place. Developing countries worked to set up the
Fund to mirror their expectations and funding needs. As Moore (2012) highlights, the Adaptation
Fund’s development stands out as a “substantial departure from the historical norms of
development that it represents.” We see developing countries using the Adaptation Fund as a tool
to reshape norms from its inception. This suggests that the Adaptation Fund is a critical place to
look to in order to understand evolving norms around developing-developed countries
relationships on adaptation finance today.
The Adaptation Fund debate in the post-Paris Agreement era
While the entry into force of the Paris Agreement did usher in overall certainty that the
international community had renewed its efforts to manage climate change, some structures

3

It is worth noting that, given US ratification of the Paris Agreement, an Adaptation Fund under the Paris
Agreement would mean the US now have an official say in the structure and function of the Fund. This is a change
from the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol where the US had decreased involvement because they never
ratified the Protocol.
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under the UNFCCC were simultaneously thrown into a realm of uncertainty. In particular, it was
unclear whether structures created under the Kyoto Protocol would be continued under the Paris
Agreement. The Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period ends in 2020, and parties to the
UNFCCC needed to decide what pieces of the Protocol would be transferred, in some manner, to
the Paris Agreement and what elements would fade into UNFCCC history. This marked a critical
moment for how norms, established under the Kyoto Protocol, would be continued or revisited in
the era of the Paris Agreement. This transition period is of particular relevance when studying
the divisions between developed and developing countries because of the Kyoto Protocol’s role
in entrenching the differentiation between these two groups.
The Adaptation Fund, which was created under the Kyoto Protocol, has emerged as one
of the centerpieces of the debate over what should be moved under the Paris Agreement. The
decision, adopted by the COP alongside the Paris Agreement (Draft decision 1/CP.21), states that
the COP “decides that the Green Climate Fund [(GCF)] and the Global Environment Facility
[(GEF)], the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention,
as well as the Least Developed Countries Fund [(LDCF)] and the Special Climate Change Fund
[(SCCF)], administered by the Global Environment Facility, shall serve the Agreement” (United
Nations 2015, 8). The term shall serve holds legal weight and means that these funding
mechanisms will be used under the Paris Agreement as the primary forms of managing funds for
mitigation and adaptation.
The Adaptation Fund was called out in a separate decision which says the COP
“recognizes that the Adaptation Fund may serve the Agreement, subject to relevant decisions by
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol [(CMP)]
and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement

20

[(CMA)]” (United Nations 2015, 8-9). The term may serve implied that while the parties had not
excluded the Adaptation Fund from serving the Paris Agreement, they put the matter up for
negotiations at future meetings. According to Gastelumendi and Gnittke (2017), parties said they
could not make the decision for the Adaptation Fund to serve the Paris Agreement for legal
reasons—the CMP, not just the COP, needed to be involved in determining the Adaptation
Fund’s role under the Paris Agreement. However, Gastelumendi and Gnittke (2017) also suggest
that the delayed Adaptation Fund decision was politically driven, although the details of specific
party-political positions are not well documented due to the lack of transparency during the Paris
Agreement negotiations (Dimitrov 2016). Through this distinction between the Adaptation Fund
and all the other UNFCCC-related climate funds, the debate over the fate of the Adaptation Fund
in the post-Paris Agreement era was born.
Two previous events compounded Adaptation Fund advocates’ concerns about the future
of the Fund: the creation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2010 (Kuyper et al 2018) and a
collapse in the price of carbon in 2012 (Climate Finance Advisory Service 2017; New Climate
Institute and Germanwatch 2017; Weikmans 2017). First, the GCF was set to support
‘transformative’ mitigation and adaptation projects, so it seemed that the mandate would
partially overlap with that of the Adaptation Fund. As a result, there were conversations about
dissolving the Adaptation Fund into the GCF; however, no decisions have been taken to move in
this direction yet (World Resources Institute 2017). Those parties who see the Adaptation Fund
as filling a specific niche within the international climate finance architecture see even these
initial conversations as threats to the work of the Adaptation Fund.
The CMP originally structured the Adaptation Fund to be partially funded by a share of
proceeds from the CDM. The idea was to invest the returns from mitigation into adaptation
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projects (Winkler and Depledge 2018). According to Weikmans (2017), 190 million dollars
flowed to the Adaptation Fund from the mechanism between 2009 and 2015. However, the price
of carbon credits dropped from US$20 in 2008 to below US$3 in 2012 (Weikmans 2017). Thus,
in the past six years, this ‘innovative source of funding’ has all but dried up. Now, the
Adaptation Fund is largely dependent on donations from developed countries, making its funding
sources aligned with that of the other large climate funds (i.e., less unique). These funding
concerns meant that developing country interests in defending the Adaptation Fund had already
started to solidify leading up to COP21.
Following the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on November 4, 2016, the COP
established the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA). The APA initially had
six Agenda Items (called Agenda Items 3-8), which were constructed as a framework to establish
the ‘Paris Rulebook.’ However, it was quickly recognized that an agenda item would need to be
exclusively dedicated to resolving the issue of the Adaptation Fund, so APA Agenda Item 8A
was created to specifically focus on “matters related to the Adaptation Fund.” Scholars have
highlighted the emergence of the Adaptation Fund negotiations as a “flash-point around finance”
(Winkler and Depledge 2018, 142) and “a contentious question” (Voigt 2017, 360) illustrating
how this small fund evolved into a prominent concern. While other Agenda Items focused on
broad topics such as emissions accounting, NDCs, and adaptation communication, Agenda Item
8A represented the negotiating area with the narrowest focus under the APA.
Methodology
This article employs narrative political analysis as described by Wagenaar (2011) to
analyze post-Paris Agreement negotiations under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris
Agreement (APA), the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
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Kyoto Protocol (CMP), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), and the Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). The main data source is observations and
associated notes from authors’ attendance at COP21 (Author 1), COP22 (Author 1), COP23
(Author 1 & 2), and COP24 (Author 1 & 2). Specifically, authors attended negotiating sessions
on adaptation topics each day of the COPs, totaling 44 days of observation, and took close notes
to capture each delegate’s comments over the course of the entire negotiating session. These
notes are complemented by notes produced by the Research and Independent NGO (RINGO)
constituency group at COP23, SB48, and COP24 on adaptation-related negotiating streams. The
RINGO group provides three sets of notes on almost all APA meetings which allowed for
comparison and confirmation of information captured at each of these sessions.
Together with these in-person notes, we reviewed all publicly available UNFCCC party
submissions, informal notes, and decisions on the UNFCCC website about the Adaptation Fund
from 2015-present. The document review also included a review of relevant materials generated
by the Adaptation Fund Board available on the Adaptation Fund website. In addition, we held
informal conversations with adaptation negotiators at COP21-24; however, formal interviews
were not conducted because adaptation negotiators did not have time for extended interviews.
While we recognize that these interviews would provide additional nuances to the data, the goal
of this paper is to observe the developing-developed country dynamics on display during the
official negotiations to understand public-facing adaptation finance norm development. Similar
to Nelson’s (2016) approach to studying African countries positions at UN climate and
environment meetings, this article draws on negotiation observations and public party
submissions to the UNFCCC to study this element of global environmental politics.
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We analyzed these data using qualitative thematic analysis techniques designed to unpack
UNFCCC party positions on the Adaptation Fund. As Blaxekjaer and Nielsen (2015, 754)
suggest, the narrative political analysis approach “allows us to understand the arguments (strong
rhetoric) of these political groups and examine how these arguments are also expressed and
reaffirmed in narrative form as identity through the very organization of the political group, thus
also reinforcing an identity-based imperative for certain action.” This process aligns closely with
our efforts to more deeply understand the norm building project around adaptation finance.
Specifically, we explore Moore’s characteristics of norms that are more likely to become
institutionalized which include:
“The authority or perceived legitimacy of the actor promoting the norm; the degree to
which the norm “fits” or resonates with the dominant norm-complex; the skill of norm
articulation by the norm-entrepreneur; the material environment of natural, human, and
technological resource distribution among states; and the norm’s fit with key actors’
identities” (Moore 2012, 33).
Dimitrov suggests that “understanding the diplomatic process is necessary for explaining the
outcome” (2016, 2). Through reconstructing narratives during this set of UNFCCC meetings, we
work to understand normative structures around climate adaptation finance to gain insight into
the trajectory of adaptation and climate finance in the Paris Agreement era.
Research Findings & Discussion
The Adaptation Fund negotiations from COP22-COP24
The below outline of country positions from COP22 to COP24 pays particular attention
to how these shared positions are central to norm development. We argue that while norms
around adaptation finance pre-Paris Agreement were still a contested space (Moore 2012),
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developing countries4 in the post-Paris Agreement phase are broadly working to preserve justicebased norms to the greatest extent possible under the Paris Agreement using the Adaptation Fund
as one of their primary tools. Their efforts are grounded in the historic dominant norm-complex
of common but differentiated responsibility which is closely tied to their identity within the
UNFCCC negotiations.
COP22.
During the negotiations, developing countries crafted a narrative that the very future of
global climate adaptation rested on the shoulders of a continued Adaptation Fund. This
intentional framing seems to point to substantial skill on behalf of developing country
negotiators looking to expand the importance of the Adaptation Fund from a small entity to a
defining statement of the UNFCCC’s principles. In an informal consultation, a delegate from the
Philippines remarked that the Adaptation Fund “is absolutely essential for developing countries,”
and a representative from Egypt stated, “Not allowing the Adaptation Fund to serve the Paris
Agreement would kill adaptation” (APA8A Informal Consultation, 11/10/2016). These
comments push the connectivity between the Fund and the broadest conceptualization of climate
adaptation. While the developed countries reaffirmed their general support of the Adaptation
Fund, as illustrated by a comment from the US delegation, “we all agree that we need to enhance
the Adaptation Fund and increase direct finance. [This is] not [an] argument about [the]
importance of adaptation” (APA8A Informal Consultation, 11/10/2016) —the industrialized
countries were not rushed to make decisions on the Fund’s future at COP22. Developing

4

When examining negotiating positions in the context of developed and developing countries, it is essential to note
that the divisions between and within developed and developing country negotiating blocs are not simple, rather they
are dynamic, evolving, and have, in some cases, even splintered into competing factions on many issues under the
UNFCCC (Ciplet and Roberts 2017). However, regarding the Adaptation Fund’s continuation, the largely unified
positions of the developed and developing countries, respectively, are particularly pronounced as demonstrated in
the following sections.

25

countries clearly harnessed the narrative on the Fund. COP22 ended with a decision that the
Adaptation Fund should, not shall, serve the Paris Agreement, which was not the ideal outcome
for developing countries. However, it was the first step towards ‘saving’ the Adaptation Fund
which quickly evolved to represent the preservation of justice-based norms under the UNFCCC.
COP23. This ardent and almost unanimous support from the developing countries only
intensified leading up to and during COP23. A delegate representing the Alliance of Small Island
States (AOSIS), for example, argued, “the Adaptation Fund is a highly important component of
the finance architecture. [We] highlight [the] comparative advantage of the Fund to leverage
finance. [We] focus on country ownership…The Adaptation Fund is critical” (SBI Report on the
Adaptation Fund, 11/7/2017). A representative from the Least Developed Countries (LDC) bloc
expressed, “we believe that the Adaptation Fund is a Fund we are proud of because it has
provided a lot of support to our member states” (SBI Report on the Adaptation Fund, 11/7/2017).
At the closing plenary of COP23, multiple high-level delegates from the SIDS, such as the
president of Tuvalu and the Vice President of Micronesia, dedicated part of their three-minute
interventions to highlight the importance of the Adaptation Fund to their countries. This
persistent narrative from so many actors in the UNFCCC system, again, suggests the Fund’s
close association with salvaging justice-based norms.
Developed countries continued to express support for the Adaptation Fund, but, through
looking at the broader political context, we see that developed countries also understood that
holding out on this decision provided them significant negotiating leverage in this, and other
areas, of the COP (Winkler and Depledge 2018). Meanwhile, the time and political capital
invested in this issue by developing countries, especially the G77 and China, the LDC bloc, and
the Africa Group, was significant, particularly considering the relatively modest levels of
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funding available through the Fund. Ultimately, the developing countries were successful, and
the parties finalized the CMP decision that the Adaptation Fund shall serve the Paris Agreement.
However, this agreement still required a partner decision from the CMA expected to come at
COP24.
COP24. COP24 focused on technical negotiations around significant elements of the Paris
Agreement which culminated in the Paris Rulebook. Discussions on the Adaptation Fund were
no exception with the negotiations intended to focus on the function and future of specific
mechanisms within the structure of the Fund. However, as countries negotiated details of the
Adaptation Fund’s transition to the Paris Agreement, the same blocs as in prior years continued
to intervene with their high, but not substantive, praise for the work of the Adaptation Fund. For
example, the representative from the G77 and China stated,
I am making this intervention because…the G77 has always valued the important role
that the Adaptation Fund has played and continues to play in supporting developing
countries in terms of the adaptation side of things. We also value their innovativeness. [It
is] unique in that it is one of the only funds that provides full grant funding (CMP
Agenda Item 7 Informal Consultation, 12/5/2018).
A Malawi delegate on behalf of the LDCs echoed this sentiment in their comment, “The LDCs
see the Adaptation Fund as one of the most, very key funds. It was established to support
developing countries. We want to see the Adaptation Fund move forward as soon as we can and
that it is serving the Paris Agreement as soon as we can” (APA Agenda Item 8A Informal
Consultations, 12/6/2018). These comments reaffirm countries’ dedication to the Fund’s
existence, but they did not serve to move negotiations forward on the specific technical issues at
hand. All negotiators in the room are well aware of developing countries’ support for the
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Adaptation Fund, so it is of note that developing countries continue to spend their limited time
and political capital on their overarching statements of support rather than advancing their ideal
outcomes on the technical issues. This may signal a continued focus on norm defining instead of
issue resolution.
Some substantive negotiations did take place with much of the focus on the
complementarity of the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund. Delegates suggested
options ranging from the funds having clear communication with each other to the Adaptation
Fund being accredited as a GCF entity. These vastly different proposals highlight that the exact
future of the Fund is still uncertain, despite the decision at COP23 that the Adaptation Fund shall
serve the Paris Agreement. One delegate working closely with the Adaptation Fund expressed
that while her organization often provides critiques of the Fund’s work to urge them to improve,
“At this COP, we are just focused on saving the Fund” (Personal communication, 12/6/2018). A
clear and delineated relationship with the GCF, practically speaking, will be essential for
countries to efficiently access resources for climate adaptation efforts, so this will be an area to
watch looking ahead to COP25.
From COP22-COP24, developing countries successfully crafted a narrative around the
Adaptation Fund that made its continuation, in its current form, a referendum on justice-based
norms under the UNFCCC. It is unknown if the Fund would have continued regardless of this
significant political investment on behalf of the developing countries. Yet, we clearly see that
their work to frame the Adaptation Fund translated into setting “standards of justice or fairness”
which ultimately impact the international laws governing climate change (Moore 2012). The
next step is to understand why these countries pushed the Adaptation Fund to the forefront of the
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global climate change agenda as their tool to preserve justice-based norms within the realm of
climate change adaptation in the context of a highly uneven political field.
Why save the Adaptation Fund?
According to our analysis of the interventions during the post-Paris Agreement
negotiations, there are four central reasons, cited by developing countries, for their support of the
Adaptation Fund: 1) the sense that the creation of the Adaptation Fund in the early 2000s was a
“developing country win” which should be sustained and maintained as a key area where fairness
principles have been ingrained in the UNFCCC process; 2) frustration with other funds perceived
to be less accessible; 3) the Adaptation Fund's unique traits such as the safeguard program, direct
access, and country ownership of the projects; and 4) their assertion that funded projects have
been successful. This set of assertions support the idea of the Adaptation Fund as a mechanism
not only to safeguard justice-based norms, but also to flatten power hierarchies within the
adaptation finance negotiations under the UNFCCC.
A developing country win. In the post-Paris Agreement world that introduced substantial
uncertainty for the Fund’s future, developing country parties saw the Adaptation Fund as a
priority for overall adaptation negotiations. To abandon it would be to abandon a symbol of
developing country power in the international system and a real tool that worked to place
developed and developing countries on more equal footing in adaptation finance negotiations and
practice. As illustrated above, it would also mean the loss of a critical tool used to establish
justice-based norms within the UNFCCC.
At COP23, the Bahamas on behalf of G77 and China reminded the parties, “it goes
without saying, [the] Adaptation Fund is something that developing countries have very strong
feelings towards” (SBI Informal Consultation on the Adaptation Fund, 11/7/2017). In their

29

proposed draft decision text at SB48, the bloc of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay suggest that the
first substantive text reads, “Highlighting the importance of the Adaptation Fund as a key and
innovative funding institution of the Convention and Kyoto Protocol, and of the work it has done
for supporting developing countries with regards to adaptation, including through enhanced
direct access modalities” (ABU Submission to APA8A, 5/1/2017). The political environment in
which the Fund was created, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, was not welcoming to the idea of
increasing developing country power to have a say in the Fund’s structure and governance. Yet,
developing countries overcame this hurdle, in part because they could point to justice-based
norms around differentiation. This ‘win’ to have a Fund that presented a more evenly distributed
power structure appears fresh in the minds of developing country negotiators and continues to
play a decisive role in how parties negotiate on the Adaptation Fund today—17 years after its
creation.
Frustration with other funding mechanisms. Developing country parties’ support for the
Adaptation Fund is also born out of frustration with other climate change adaptation funding
options, especially the Green Climate Fund It should be noted that developing country
negotiators provide high praise for the GCF as a concept. For example, the Philippines on behalf
of the G77 and China stated that “GCF is clearly a part of COP and is very dear to the
developing countries” (GCF and GEF Contact Group, 11/10/2016). However, delegates also
highlight that its implementation has introduced challenges for developing country governments.
There is a feeling that the GCF does not adequately prioritize adaptation. Even at COP23 in
2017, when it was already agreed that the Adaptation Fund would be maintained, “G77 countries
argued against the plans to include the Adaptation Fund in the Green Climate Fund, as they
feared adaptation finance might be downplayed in the latter” (Kuyper et al 2018).
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The Philippines emphasized this during a meeting on the Report of the Adaptation Fund
Board at COP23 stating, “this is a Fund that we feel, for developing countries, is a necessary one.
More and more it is the only Fund that we can have grants for adaptation very clearly. And many
countries can only get grants—they can’t do co-financing” (CMP Contact Group on Report of
the Adaptation Fund Board, 11/9/2017). Here, the Philippines delegate demonstrates that
developing countries ought to have grant support not only because loans and co-financing are
overly burdensome, but also because it is the obligation of developed countries to provide
funding given their disproportionate responsibility for the problem. Thus, it is a call for
recognizing differentiated capabilities and obligations embedded in the concept of justice-based
norms.
At COP23, parties expressed that the GCF has yet to perform to the standards they have
come to expect from the Adaptation Fund. Specifically, Ghana on behalf of the G77 and China
explained that the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) readiness process under the GCF has
presented challenges especially in the form of process delays. The delegate explained, “[our]
objective here today is that we get some sort of confidence that we can leave, and countries will
be able [to] access money as easily as possible” (Informal Consultation on the NAPs, 11/7/2017).
Egypt affirmed the position of the G77 and China and suggested that the GCF has issues with
exclusivity. The delegate from Bhutan explained that they faced similar challenges accessing
funding through the GEF. Developing countries use these concerns to elevate the Adaptation
Fund as the only fund that is currently adequately serving their interests. In the broader political
economic context, we see developing countries demonstrate an obligation to ensuring fair
climate finance for their countries. Thus, we can interpret the above statements in three primary
ways. This rhetoric may be employed to build up this articulated difference between the funds to

31

make a broader point about climate finance, not because they do not like the GCF in practice.
Alternatively, developing countries see it as critical to preserve the fund that is working
especially while the newer GCF addresses it growing pains. The third option is that it is some
combination of politically driven rhetoric to shape the narrative around the Adaptation Fund as
well as genuine concern about losing the benefits of the Fund.
The unique traits of the Adaptation Fund. Developing countries further express that the
structure and governance of the Adaptation Fund are favorable because they ensure direct access,
country ownership, orientation towards smaller projects, and experience with different types of
funding. The Adaptation Fund is touted as the first climate funding mechanism to provide direct
access which means that once a country has an accredited national implementing entity (NIE),
the country can access support directly from the Adaptation Fund without using a third party
such as the multilateral organizations (i.e., UNDP, UNEP, etc.). While the GCF has adopted the
direct access idea from the Adaptation Fund, country argue that the process is not yet refined and
not all funds under the GCF can be granted through a direct access mechanism. In the
negotiations, developing country representatives affirmed their appreciation of the direct access
modality. Uganda stated on behalf of the LDCs, “Many LDCs have benefited from [the] Fund
especially through the direct access modality that we have always cried out for” (SBI Review of
the Adaptation Fund, 11/7/2017). A G77 and China delegate also remarked, “The direct access
modality is working, is achieving results, and it is, in fact, a tool that is working as we hoped”
(SBI Review of the Adaptation Fund, 11/7/2017). Direct access, developing country parties
argue, results in more country ownership of the projects and thus more effective adaptation
outcomes.
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Parties also see the Adaptation Fund’s positioning as a ‘small project funder’ to be
advantageous. The GCF is designed to deal with larger projects that address either mitigation,
adaptation, or both, so, the developing country parties argue, the GCF meets a different need
than the Adaptation Fund. Finally, the Adaptation Fund has significant experience managing
‘innovative sources of funding’ for adaptation. While the share of proceeds from the CDM has
basically collapsed, the Fund still has years of experience working with that funding source.
Developing countries suggest that this means the Adaptation Fund can be more agile in working
with new ‘innovative sources of funding’ that the Parties might recommend in the future (New
Climate Institute and Germanwatch 2017). Given the confluence of these Adaptation Fund
characteristics, parties argue that the Adaptation Fund plays a unique and complementary role to
the other major funding mechanisms—the GEF and the GCF.
Interestingly, while parties highlight these features as a way to differentiate the
Adaptation Fund, it also demonstrates that they were not able to exert the influence of
Adaptation Fund structures and governance onto the newer GCF. For example, while the GCF
does have some direct access options as described above, it does not have the majority
developing country representation on the Board. The fact that the Adaptation Fund’s justicebased structures were not entirely replicated under the GCF emphasizes this broader movement
towards liberal based norms. Thus, another political reason why developing countries continue to
grasp onto these unique characteristics of the Adaptation Fund.
A record of success. Finally, developing countries suggest that, in addition to the historical and
functional reasons to continue the Adaptation Fund, its effectiveness is also paramount. Counties
articulate the Fund’s effectiveness in two main ways throughout the negotiations. First, they
suggest that the demand on the Fund, meaning the number of proposals submitted, shows that
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countries find the funding and the resulting projects to be valuable; therefore, demand continues
to rise. Bahamas on behalf of the G77 and China, shared that “the experiences so far have been
extremely positive. The Fund has never been more in demand in acting on its mandate” (SBI
Review of the Adaptation Fund, 11/7/2017). A Germanwatch report confirms this intervention,
and states, “near- and medium-term funding needs of the Adaptation Fund can be projected in
the order of US$130 million annually, only for the Adaptation Fund’s national programmes”
(New Climate Institute and Germanwatch 2017).
Second, Negotiators also highlight the Fund’s effectiveness through alluding to the
results from work happening on the ground. In expressing their gratitude for the Report on the
Adaptation Fund presented at COP23, Argentina expressed that it “really captures how essential
[the Adaptation Fund] is for catalyzing adaptation” (SBI Review of the Adaptation Fund,
11/7/2017). The European Union joined the choir of praise for Adaptation Fund projects
implemented so far stating, “[We have] high appreciation for the work of the Adaptation Fund. It
has been shown now for several years that it performs well on concrete adaptation actions, [we
are] particularly very happy with that, especially because the EU is the biggest financier of the
Fund” (SBI Review of the Adaptation Fund, 11/7/2017). The overall message coming out of the
post-Paris Agreement negotiations on the Adaptation Fund is that the Fund works especially in
the eyes of the developing country representatives.
In analyzing these negotiating sessions, it is central to acknowledge that the UNFCCC is
both a political and a policy process. Thus, country representatives are motivated by not only
policy goals, but also political positioning. Applying a political economic lens, we see that while
there is meaning within the actual words stated, as analyzed above, there is also underlying
motivation in these methods of positioning discussed here. We argue that the motivations are
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stemming from a strong desire to preserve justice and fairness based on differentiation in the
UNFCCC system which countries feel helps to flatten power structures which historically placed
developed countries in control. The next section of the article discusses how the race to preserve
justice-based norms in the UNFCCC may have implications on the long-term trajectory of the
Adaptation Fund’s projects.
Next steps for the Adaptation Fund
At SB48 in May 2018, COP24 in December 2018, and SB50 in May 2019, parties were
faced with starting to establish how the Adaptation Fund would serve the Paris Agreement.
Several parties suggested that this process of operationalization creates a window of opportunity
for parties to make substantive changes to the Fund’s operations. Possible areas of reform could
be the secretariat arrangement, trusteeship, revision of Fund safeguards, new sources of funding,
and the composition of the Adaptation Fund Board (Climate Finance Advisory Service 2017).
But other parties, including Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Arab Group, and the bloc of
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay urged the Parties not to make changes to the Fund because “it
has been enormously successful in its current form” (APA8A Informal Consultation, 5/4/2018).
Saudi Arabia further stated that the objective during the transition time is to “do no harm to the
existing Fund” (APA8A Informal Consultation, 5/7/2018). Indeed, there was a strong sentiment
that the Fund works as is and the parties should not point out faults or tamper with it. In terms of
norm development, opening these areas up for debate would welcome alternative norms to be
formed around the Adaptation Fund. Thus, we can interpret that some developing country parties
may also have this additional motivation to confirm that the Fund is ‘fit for purpose’ in its
current form to prevent new norm cultivation.
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At COP24 and SB50, counties engaged in negotiations around the composition of the
Adaptation Fund Board under the Paris Agreement. Opening discussions on the Board
composition brings to light efforts to introduce a new power dynamic in the governance of the
Fund and is a prime example of developed countries trying to negotiate away from justice-based
norms. When the Adaptation Fund was under the Kyoto Protocol, non-Kyoto parties could not
serve on the Board, namely the United States. Once the Fund has been moved to the Paris
Agreement, new parties will be able to serve on the Board. Developing countries, who currently
have a mandated majority of seats on the Board, would like to maintain its composition
especially during the transition time. However, countries, such as Switzerland, suggested that a
new spot should be created on the Board now for a non-Kyoto country party to be a part of the
transition period decisions. This became a major flashpoint in the negotiations.
Interesting, when asked what the practical implications of an adjusted Board composition
means for the day-to-day function of the Adaptation Fund, the current chair of the Adaptation
Fund stated that while it is a political matter that he cannot comment on, “the Adaptation Fund
Board has not once voted, all decisions have been made by consensus, so one could argue that
the composition doesn’t matter in that sense because all decisions have been consensus” (COP24
Side Event, 12/6/2018). This reinforces that politics and power structures are shaping the COP24
negotiations on Board composition rather than pragmatic decision making based on the actually
implications for the Adaptation Fund.
These negotiations demonstrate the event with the decision that the Adaptation Fund
“shall serve the Paris Agreement,” the Fund is not yet saved. The tenants of the Fund are still
open for debate, and thus, we see that developing countries continue to feel pressure to defend
the Fund in order to protect the remnants of justice-based norms under the UNFCCC.
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Conclusion
As global environmental governance continues to shift towards more liberal norms, the
Adaptation Fund represents one of the last strong-holds of justice-based norms. The upcoming
negotiating sessions will reveal the extent to which these norms will be enhanced, stay the same,
or be eroded through revisions of the Fund’s structure and governance. Thus, political economy
continues to be a critical tool to employ as power dynamics will be central to how these policy
changes take shape. Will the historically rooted justice-based norms defended by the developing
countries prevail or will traditionally dominant power (i.e., the United States, the EU,
Switzerland, etc.) succeed in putting themselves at the center of control of the Fund?
Tracking this trajectory guides our understanding of the future of the rapidly-growing
climate finance sector. This includes the priorities of the funds, the rules that will govern how
funding is distributed, and the way that projects are monitored and evaluated. Future research in
global environmental politics will be necessary to unpack how norms at the international level—
be it justice-based or liberal norms—differentially impact project planning, implementation, and
long-term sustainability. After all, the effectiveness of projects to increase community resilience
to the impacts of climate change must remain the central goal of this entire effort despite the
politics.
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CHAPTER 3
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: A CASE
STUDY OF COUNTRY-WIDE ADAPTATION PROJECTS IN SAMOA
Abstract
Countries across the Pacific region have experienced a surge in internationally funding
for climate adaptation initiatives. In the Independent State of Samoa, two major projects—
funded by the Adaptation Fund and the World Bank Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
(PPCR)—have supported adaptation planning and activity implementation in most villages
across the country. These country-wide initiatives range from conducting LiDAR studies and
updating Community Integrated Management (CIM) plans to installing rainwater catchment and
storage tanks and reforesting water catchment areas. These projects inherently present a multilevel governance challenge because they are developed at the national level, are funded and
monitored at the international level, and ultimately implemented in communities. This chapter
explores the extent to which interactions across governance levels and scales advance effective
adaptation to climate change. Based on in-country interviews, site observations, and observations
of the Adaptation Fund’s terminal evaluation process, this chapter presents evidence from these
major adaptation initiatives in Samoa to highlight where multi-level governance had been
leveraged to enhance the governance of adaptation as well as areas of the projects where this has
not occurred. It further examines the trade-offs inherent in efforts to work across governance
scales and levels in conducting climate change adaptation. This chapter has been submitted as a
chapter in the Handbook “Managing Climate Change Adaptation in the Pacific Region” which is
published by Springer as a part of the book series, “Climate Change Management.” Anama
Solofa will be a co-author for her contribution during the fieldwork stage of the project.
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Introduction
Pacific Island countries are on the front lines of climate change impacts. At a 1.5°C
temperature rise above pre-industrial levels, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) projects that small islands will experience freshwater stress, coastal flooding, negative
impacts on marine ecosystems, and migration induced, at least partially, by sea level rise
(Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018). In fact, island states such as Samoa are already experiencing some
of these changes. In Samoa, since 1950, annual maximum temperatures have increased by about
0.22°C each decade (MNRE 2011). Sea level rise in Samoa, at 4 mm per year since 1993
(MNRE 2011), is above the global average of 2.8-3.6 mm per year. Additional impacts include
ocean acidification which is particularly detrimental to corals, shifting rainfall patterns (i.e., less
rain in the dry season and more rain during the rainy season), and more intense tropical cyclones
(MNRE 2011).
These external forces compel Pacific Island countries to place climate change at the core
of their national priorities and to advocate for swift and robust international action to curb
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, many of the impacts listed above must be addressed regardless of
future greenhouse gas mitigation efforts because livelihoods, healthy ecosystems, and assets are
at stake. Adaptation efforts initiated around the Pacific Islands region range from incremental
steps to more transformational change. Some countries in the region have already started to
develop relocation strategies to prepare for worst case future climate scenarios. For example, Fiji
has initiated discussions on building relocation into their National Climate Change Policy, and
Kiribati has already developed a “migration with dignity” policy (Yamamoto and Esteban 2017,
146). Given that Pacific Island countries, and developing countries more broadly, are largely not
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responsible for the cause of these impacts, funding for adaptation is expected to come from highemitting developed countries.
Significant international funding has been allocated to climate change projects, especially
mitigation projects, in developing countries for over 25 years. Donor entities include the World
Bank, developed countries and their international development agencies, the European Union,
non-governmental organizations, UN programmes and offices, and funding mechanisms under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). According to the
UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance’s 2018 assessment of climate finance flows, from
2015-2016 multilateral climate funds—which include the Adaptation Fund and the Green
Climate Fund (GCF) —provided an average of US$1.9 billion for climate mitigation and
adaptation (UNFCCC 2018). By comparison, bilateral climate finance provided US$31.7 billion
and multilateral development bank climate finance summed to US$24.4 billion. All three
categories continue to primarily fund mitigation with between 21 percent and 29 percent of funds
allocated to adaptation (UNFCCC 2018). This extensive funding apparatus, coupled with the
latest reports from the IPCC detailing the wide-reaching extent of climate change impacts,
suggest that international funding for climate mitigation and adaptation projects in developing
countries will continue to be a central feature of international climate governance.
The projects stemming from these funding apparatuses inherently present a multi-level
governance challenge. In the case of climate change adaptation projects, they are often
developed by national level ministries or multilateral development organizations (i.e., UNDP,
UNEP, World Bank, etc.). Project proposals are reviewed by international panels and funding is
distributed based on internationally determined rubrics and standards. Funding moves back to
countries, usually to the national government, where it can be administered in a multitude of
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different ways. Ultimately, project implementation happens at the community level where
rainwater catchment and storage systems are installed, or riparian buffers are planted along
rivers.
It is well understood that all these levels of governance exist and function within the
overall system of climate adaptation (Hooghe and Marks 2001). This chapter explores the extent
to which interactions across governance levels and scales advance effective climate change
adaptation. Understanding these systems is critical, especially in the context of developing
countries, because the involvement of so many actors can potentially cause more harm than good
if not facilitated effectively (Chaudhai and Mishra 2016). To examine these systems, the chapter
explores evidence from an Adaptation Fund project and a World Bank Pilot Program for Climate
Resilience (PPCR) in Samoa.
The chapter first outlines a brief history of multi-level governance and describes its value
as a framework to understand implementation of climate adaptation projects. Next, it suggests
eight characteristics of multi-level governance that emerge from the literature. Through an
analysis of the Adaptation Fund and PPCR projects in Samoa, the chapter then tests the extent to
which these characteristics are apparent in a governance system which inherently involved many
different levels and scales of governance. Finally, the chapter highlights the trade-offs embedded
in this systems approach to adaptation governance.
Background: The multi-level governance framework
Rationale
Histories of international development and sustainable development show that when
projects are conducted exclusively by a top-down actor they usually fail (Adams 2009). As a
result, funders now seek projects that emphasize collaborative, community-based, and
stakeholder-driven approaches. But, writing this plan in a proposal is vastly different from
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carrying it out effectively. Further, community-based approaches face another set of challenges if
the responsibility for these projects move to the community level, but the resources for
implementation and long-term management do not (Elyachar 2005). Given that internationallyfunded climate adaptation projects seem to be following in the footsteps of international and
sustainable development initiatives (i.e., funded by many of the same sources, following similar
monitoring and evaluation processes, and aligning proposals with the Sustainable Development
Goals), avoiding these same pitfalls will be essential. This paper explores how multi-level
governance (MLG) is a useful framework to understand the extent to which projects truly engage
across the levels and scales of governance versus evoking the above buzzwords—communitybased and locally-driven—in a more superficial form.
In order to see how MLG can be used to understand internationally funded climate
adaptation projects, it is critical to understand the multiplicity of ways that MLG has been
conceived since the term emerged in the 1990s. At its root, MLG describes the diffusion of
power from a central government to other levels of governance. In this way, governance roles
would be shared from the local to the international levels—an effort to correct for the failures of
national, top-down approaches to development. Yet, today it is largely recognized that there is a
need for balance across levels of governance after critiques of state interventions swung the
pendulum away from state responsibility, as with the Washington Consensus and neoliberalization, which moved power and responsibility away from the central government to the
markets. As described by Steger and Roy, neo-liberalism is “a mode of governance that
embraces the idea of the self-regulating free market, with its associated values of competition
and self-interest, as a model for effective and efficient government” (2010, 12). These structures,
embraced by the US and imposed on many developing countries, move responsibility to other
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levels of government, but do not provide any resources or support for those levels of government
to manage the services previously administered by the central government (Elyachar 2005). This
is chiefly because under neoliberalism, the state’s goals are the “deregulation of the economy,
the liberalization of trade and industry, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises,” so a
central government would assume that decentralized services would be supported via market
mechanisms (Steger and Roy 2010, 14).
Today, scholars employ MLG as an instrument which recognizes the faults of both
overly-centralized or overly market-based governance. Instead, contemporary MLG provides a
frame to describe “political decentralization within states” which refers to distributing power to
the supranational level, to the sub-national level, and out to private entities (Hooghe and Marks
2001, 3). This form of governance, originally conceived as a way to understand the governance
of the European Union, was expected to be more efficient and inclusive of all stakeholders.
There are many derivatives of MLG discussed in the literature as “multi-tiered governance;
polycentric governance; multi-perspectival governance; functional, overlapping, competing
jurisdictions (FOCJ); fragmegration (or SOAs); and consortio and condominio” (Hooghe and
Marks 2001, 3). This idea of MLG as a frame to understand governance structures has been
employed by scholars to study international environmental change (Janicke 2017). Drawing on
Janicke (2017), this chapter uses MLG to study internationally funded climate change adaptation
projects.
We aim to test what aspects of MLG are present in the Samoan adaptation projects as
well as aspects of the framework that are less applicable to this specific context. Samoa is home
to two country-wide adaptation projects, of which one is complete and the other is in its final
phase. The Government of Samoa considers climate change a national priority. Thus, the Samoa
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case provided an ideal location for preliminary research to test this form of adaptation project
analysis. Further, emerging trends from the Samoa case, while not generalizable to all
Adaptation Fund or World Bank projects, may provide valuable takeaways to consider in future
projects development and implementation.
We explore MLG within the context of the Cash et al. (2006) model of MLG interactions.
Cash et al. define scales “as the spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used to
measure and study any phenomenon” (Gibson et al. 2000 in Cash et al. 2006, 2). Levels are seen
as the “unit of analysis that are located at different positions on a scale (Gibson et al. 2000 in
Cash et al. 2006, 4). For example, the jurisdictional scale includes the local, regional, national,
and international levels. Cash et al. (2006) provide a differentiation between cross- and multiscale and level interactions. Cross-scale indicates that there is actual interaction between the
scale, level, or both, while multi-scale simply implies that the different levels or scales exist.
Throughout this chapter, the term MLG is intended to encompass the above definition. Using this
understanding of existence and potential for interaction between scales and levels, we explore the
characteristics of MLG as defined in the literature below.
Characteristics of MLG
Eight central characteristics of MLG are evident in the literature: 1) Devolution of power
to the supra- and sub-national levels; 2) inclusion of state and non-state actors; 3) involvement of
all scales; 4) nested levels of governance; 5) intentionality; 6) equal power across levels; 7)
fluidity; and 8) new policy solutions.
Devolution of power to the supra- and sub-national levels. MLG includes actors at both the
supra- and sub-national levels. However, it is not simply that these entities are named in a
proposal, but rather that power (i.e., resources, decision-making ability, etc.) is devolved to them
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(Keskitalo 2010). This implies that the entities have access to participation in the governance
process (Stephenson 2013).
Inclusion of state and non-state actors. While governments may have a central role in
facilitating MLG processes, non-state actors are also integrated in this framework. Keskitalo
(2010) adds that both private and public entities need to be engaged across all the levels meaning
that inclusion of multilateral development organizations is not sufficient to consider non-state
actors adequately integrated into the governance process. Gumeta-Gómez et al. (2016) cite
government agencies, communities, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as
specific examples of stakeholders in a MLG process. This makes the system necessarily complex
with the involvement of “a multitude of actors” (Brockhaus 2012, 201).
Involvement of all scales. Cash et al. (2006) identifies seven scales that are necessary to
consider when studying human-environment interactions (see Figure 3). The scales are spatial
(with levels being areas from global to a single landscape), temporal (dealing with rates,
durations, and frequencies), jurisdictional (governance levels from international to national to
provincial to localities), institutional (dealing with rules that exist from international law to local
norms), management (from strategies to plans to tasks), networks (dealing with links between
people from ‘trans-society’ to family), and knowledge (defining truth from universal to
contextual) (Cash et al. 2006, 3). To understand how MLG functions, it is important to explore
the interaction across all these scales and their levels which creates a complex matrix of actors,
institutions, and structures (Buckeley and Betsill 2005, Hooghe and Marks 2001, Keskitalo
2010).
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Nested levels of governance. Drawing from Ostrom’s (2012) polycentric governance, the idea
of nested governance is that the levels of governance need simultaneous independence and
interdependence (Cole 2011, Keskitalo 2010). While dependence creates linkages between
entities, any level can also produce independent policy and decisions which are based on the
outcome of interactions across the levels. Stephenson describes this as “a mutual dependency
through the intertwining of policy-making activities” (2013, 817). This concept of the nature of
interactions between levels and across scales is central to the functioning of a MLG system.
Intentionality. Cole (2011) emphasizes that these MLG systems and the interactions, nested or
otherwise, that characterize the system do not happen by accident. Rather, they are an intentional
strategy to “determine the appropriate division of responsibility and authority between
governance institutions and organizations at global, national, state, and local levels” (Cole 2011,
2). Interesting, in the case of internationally funded adaptation projects, multiple levels of
governance are always involved in an adaptation project. This makes intentionality paramount
because otherwise the involvement of so many actors can be more of a burden than a support
system (Chaudhai and Mishra 2016). So, the extent to which MLG is strategically embraced in
order to facilitate adaptation may dictate certain elements of success in the project.
Equal power across levels. Stephenson (2013) suggests that a part of this intentional effort to
foster effective MLG is creating an environment where the levels of governance interact on equal
footing. He states, “MLG implies engagement and influence—no level of activity being superior
to the other” (Stephenson 2013, 817). Similarly, Cash et al. (2006) highlights that knowledge
should be co-produced in MLG systems. This may be one of the most challenging characteristics
of MLG in the context of internationally funded climate adaptation because it envisions that a
community has the same power as the national government or the funding entity. Understanding
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how power structures are reinforced, renegotiated, or redesigned as a result of a MLG process is
central to this study.
Fluidity. All the characteristics listed above are evolving—not static. This fluidity in the MLG
system is central to how Buckeley and Betsill (2005) and Hooghe and Marks (2001) describe
MLG. It is supposed to be a system that is adaptive and formed by the sum of its parts.
New policy solutions. In terms of outcomes of a MLG system, Cash et al. (2006) argue that
MLG should facilitate the generation of new policy solutions that were not accessible prior to the
effective usage of MLG. These solutions incorporate, and build on, co-production of knowledge
and continuous negotiation across levels and scales.
Applying MLG to internationally funded climate adaptation projects in developing
countries
From the broadest perspective, MLG translates well to the study of climate change
governance because while climate change is a global phenomenon, the international scale is not
always the most appropriate place to address the challenge (Adger 2001). Evaluating the
characteristics of MLG can be particularly instructive when thinking about internationally
funded climate adaptation projects taking place in developing countries because not only the
concept of climate change, but the projects themselves are constantly maneuvering across and
between governance levels and scales.
MLG in the developing country context can be complicated by a number of factors. First,
effective institutions are needed for MLG to function, yet countries taking on climate adaption
measures do not necessarily have those institutions in place. Second, scholars argue that MLG of
climate change adaptation will only work if it is consistent with broader development objectives.
Chaudhai and Mishra suggest that in the case of linking watershed development and climate
change adaptation in India, “for multi-level governance, to be efficient for bringing in the climate
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adaptation, coordinating and integrating climate and non-climate strategies across jurisdictions
and sectors would be essential. Without these, the multiplicity of actors, scales and levels might
be more of a hindrance rather than of any assistance” (2016, 326). Adger et al. (2003) echo
Chaudhai and Mishra (2016) by suggesting that climate change adaptation in the developing
country context will not work at any level if it is not done in tandem with general sustainable
development objectives. The third complicating factor, as Adger et al. (2003) describe, is that
developing countries are often working with limited options often because of financial resource
constraints. Finally, MLG of adaptation in developing countries often involves funding from
international sources (e.g., UNFCCC, World Bank, and other development agencies) which
changes the players involved with governance and who dictates the adaptation needs (Adger et
al. 2003). Adaptation implementation faces a different set of challenges in the developing
country context, and it critical to understand how MLG functions in this space given the
magnitude and scope of funding mobilized at the international level to support adaptation in
developing countries.
Research methodology
This project uses a case study methodology to study climate change adaptation projects in
Samoa (Creswell 2013, Yin 2014). The case study included a literature review, a review of
project documents, and fieldwork in Samoa. We conducted the fieldwork in Samoa in July 2018.
During our 2.5 weeks of fieldwork, we conducted semi-structured interviews with seven
key informants which ranged from 45 minute to three hours in length. The interviews are
referred to in the chapter as interviews 1-6 and include the date conducted (one interview
included two interviewees, referred to as A and B). We also spent two days observing the
terminal evaluation of the Adaptation Fund project. This included traveling around the entire
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island of Savai’i visiting adaptation projects funded by the Adaptation Fund with three Ministry
of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) officials, one United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) staff member, and the international independent consultant conducting the
evaluation. During this process, we observed interviews between the consultant and community
stakeholders, informal conversations between the consultant and the other staff on the trip, and
we learned all of their observations of the Adaptation Fund projects we visited. Separate from the
terminal evaluation, we also visited Adaptation Fund and PPCR funded activities on Upolu.
We analyzed the transcribed interviews, field notes, and project documents using
discourse analysis (Gee 2011). Applied broadly, discourse analysis explores the use of language
in a set of texts with the understanding that all language is both from a specific context and
situated in a larger framework of socially constructed conventions (Abrams 1999). Gee suggests
that critical discourse analysis views language as a way of communicating social practices which
“always have implications for inherently political things like status, solidarity…and power” (Gee
in Rogers 2004, 33). In this context, we were reading for descriptions of when, how, and to what
extent the national government distributed power to other levels; the difference, if any, in
perspective on the projects from stakeholder approaching the projects from different levels and
scales; and the processes and outcomes that interviewees suggested were both effective and
ineffective.
The discourse analysis was conducted using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo
by QSR International. Through a process of inductive and then deductive coding, we categorized
how elements of the projects interacted across scales and levels as well as their alignment with
the characteristics of MLG to identify where MLG occurred, to some extent, as well as where it
did not happen effectively.
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The study’s main limitation is the fieldwork duration. The chapter presents first-hand
observations of a snapshot in time rather than observations starting at the beginning of the
project process and following through to post-implementation project management. Thus, the
chapter relies on interviewee’s accounts of the entire process. Time constrains also meant that we
did not have sufficient opportunity to build relationship with village leaders and community
members to accurately capture their perceptions of the project process. Thus, this article draws
on a small set of observed interviewees between community members and the international
consultant. An additional limitation is that, while general lessons may be drawn to inform
adaptation across the Pacific region, the case study focuses specifically on the Samoan context.
Generalizations out to the regional level should be done with careful consideration of countries’
specific history, culture, economy, and geography.
The case study
Case study introduction: Climate change adaptation projects in Samoa
The Independent State of Samoa is a Small Island Developing State (SID) located in the
Pacific Islands region (Figure 2). Samoa is composed of ten islands, of which four are inhabited.
The two main islands are Upolu, where the country’s capital Apia is located, and Savai’i. As of
2017, the population of Samoa was just over 196,000 people. About the same number of
Samoans that live in country, live abroad, and the economy is dominated by remittances
(Meleisea et al. 2012). Given Samoa’s long history and rich culture, the country is often referred
to as the ‘Cradle of Polynesia.’
From the 1830s to 1962, Germany, and then New Zealand held administrative authority
in Samoa. During the last decade of this period, New Zealand initiated work with the United
Nations and Samoan leaders to craft a path to independence which was achieved in 1962. Thus,
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Samoa became the first politically independent island state in the Pacific Island region (Meleisea
et al. 2012). Since gaining independence, the Government of Samoa has faced significant
challenges, including balancing traditional norms and rules with that of Western institutional
structures that had been put in place prior to independence; broad pressures of globalization; and
most recently the impacts of climate change (Macpherson and Macpherson 2010).

Figure 2: Map of the Independent State of Samoa

In the world of international climate change policy and planning, Samoa, and other
Pacific island countries, are on the front lines—both in terms of facing climate change impacts,
and in conveying the gravity of this challenge to the international community. The region is also
at the forefront of climate change adaptation and are some of the main drivers behind obtaining
climate change adaptation financing from the international community. Samoa has made climate
change central to their overall development agenda and a broad national priority. This is seen
through their focus on climate throughout the 2016-2020 Strategy for the Development of Samoa
(SDS), their position as a founding member of the United Nations Group of Friends on Climate
and Security, and their ambitious greenhouse gas mitigation goals laid out in their Nationally
Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. Because Samoa sees addressing
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climate change as central to their country’s development and security, it seems fair to expect that
the country would have the most motivation to effectively address the issue. Thus, a country like
Samoa, that is ahead of the curve on thinking about climate change, represents a useful case to
explore the extent to which stakeholders leverage MLG to facilitate adaptation. Further, the
synergies and barriers that emerge from Samoa’s experience implementing internationally
funded adaptation projects could serve as a tool for monitoring adaptation project effectiveness
more broadly.
This case study explores two of the most recent internationally-funded adaptation
projects implemented in Samoa. The initiatives are considered sister projects designed to
complement each other—carrying out the same set of activities in different parts of the country
and sharing data throughout the duration of the projects. The first project falls under the
Adaptation Fund which is a funding mechanism designed and overseen by parties to the
UNFCCC. The Adaptation Fund project, Enhancing Resilience of Samoa’s Coastal Communities
to Climate Change, was proposed by the Samoan national government to the Adaptation Fund,
and approved by the Adaptation Fund Board in December 2011 as a US$8.7 million project. It
started in January 2013, and officially concluded mid-2018. The Samoa Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment (MNRE) served as the executing entity for the project, and the
implementing entity was UNDP. The sister project is part of the World Bank’s Pilot Program for
Climate Resilience (PPCR) initiative which provided US$14.6 million for the project, Enhancing
the Climate Resilience of Coastal Resources and Communities. The project was approved in
2013 and is set to close in June 2020. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is responsible for the
project.
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Both projects have three main components: Adaptation planning, community grants, and
major infrastructure projects. First, each project was responsible for working with a set of
villages to update their Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) plans which were originally
drafted between 2002 and 2005. During this process of planning and consulting with village
leaders, the implementers updated the plan name to the Community Integrated Management
(CIM) plans to reflect their new ‘ridge-to-reef’ approach to adaptation planning. The idea is that
activities on the island have impact on the coastal ecosystem, and vice versa, so the focus of the
management plans needs to broadly consider island-wide implications for the coast. The PPCR
project additionally funded LiDAR mapping of Upolu and Savai’i for use in both projects CIM
planning processes.
The second part of the projects were community grants. These grants, administered
through the national government’s Civil Society Support Program (CSSP), aimed to provide up
to 50,000 Tala (~US$18,900) per grant to villages to implement adaptation projects in line with
their CIM plans. Of the 45 Adaptation Fund supported CSSP projects, some of the major areas of
work included 23 projects to install rainwater harvesting and storage systems; nine projects
carried out some form of construction including retrofitting schools to serve as evacuation
shelters and building revetment walls; and, three focused on mangrove rehabilitation and
planting.
The final element of the projects was larger infrastructure activities including building
bridges to replace river fords, and tar sealing (i.e., paving) inland access roads for storm
evacuation and to encourage inland relocation of coastal villages.
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Case study results
Building on the description by Cash et al. (2006) of the scales that are necessary to
consider when studying human-environment interactions, we examine these adaptation projects
in Samoa to identify examples where a series of scales and levels work effectively together and
exhibit some of the eight characteristics of MLG (i.e., functioning MLG), and contrast that with
where the levels and scales do not seem to interact despite evidence pointing to the value these
interactions add. Figure 3 shows the Samoa case overlaid on the scales and levels identified by
Cash et al. (2006) to display the multitude of factors, actors, institutions, and structures involved
in this governance and implementation process.
The sections below describe the following Adaptation Fund and PPCR project elements:
(1) programmatic and pragmatic approach; (2) management of safeguards; (3) resources
available to project implementers; (4) project timelines; and, (5) stakeholder participation in
decision-making and project implementation. While the sections outlined above may seem to
provide disparate examples, they are selected to display the diversity of ways that MLG could be
integrated into international donor-funded adaptation projects.
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Figure 3: Scales and levels involved in environment-human systems. Details list the factors, actors, institutions, and
structures in some way connected to the internationally-funded adaptation projects in Samoa. Adapted from Cash et
al. (2006).
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Programmatic and pragmatic approach. Technical and relevant government ministries in
Samoa have substantial experience in seeking and accessing development funding assistance.
Evidence of international development aid is visible on the two main islands, from schools’ signs
labeled ‘built by the Chinese government’ and park benches sponsored by ‘The People of Japan,’
to trash stands with signage from the Global Environment Facility.
Interviewees remarked that the need to transition from a project-based approach—the
dominant paradigm used by most of the above entities—to a programmatic and pragmatic
approach to managing international funding became apparent during the development of the
Community Integrated Management (CIM) plan process (Interview 6A and 6B, 9 July 2018).
Adaptation Fund and PPCR implementing agencies saw the revised CIM plan process as an
opportunity to increase the cohesiveness of the country’s adaptation efforts by more effectively
designing connections across scales and levels, demonstrating the intentionality characteristic of
MLG. Interviewees also highlighted that a well-developed programmatic and pragmatic
approach to adaptation could serve as a model for other Pacific island countries dealing with
similar influxes of funds for climate adaptation and mitigation with convergent implementation
objectives (Interview 4, 12 July 2018).
The PPCR project is housed within the Samoa Ministry of Finance (MOF). This
placement has been key to developing the programmatic and pragmatic approach because MOF
houses financial records for all government ministries and agencies within the Government of
Samoa. Thus, they can identify areas of work within ministries and agencies that are unfunded
and related to adaptation and can then direct PPCR funding to fill those gaps. Rather than
develop new projects that may or may not align with agencies’ long-term strategies, the funding
supports on-going work that may not be implemented because of a lack of resources. For
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example, “SWA, [Samoa Water Authority], is already getting funding from the EU, but there are
gaps in the funding that they need to source from other finance, so PPCR can fill those gaps. In
that way, you have partner projects working together” (Interview 2 18 July 2018, also reflected
in Interview 4, 12 July 2018). The same interviewee explained,
“A lot of what we are doing now with the large projects, it is aligned to government
work plans, so what we did was collect the information on government priorities with
districts, we cross checked with what districts identified in the community, so we
come across, oh they need this road and it is identified here [in the government work
plan], so it was already planned, but there was no funding, so this is one way to fund
it” (Interview 2 18 July 2018, also reflected in Interview 4, 12 July 2018).
Going forward, another interviewee stated, “any money coming in, any proposal that goes out,
we see it from this national planning level” (Interview 6B, 9 July 2018).
The implementing agencies of these adaptation projects see the programmatic and
pragmatic approach as valuable because it may increase the likelihood that the activities carried
out in these discrete projects will be sustained once the project funding ends. Interviewees noted
heightened cross-ministry buy-in over the course of project implementation. For example, in the
past, representatives from the Land Transportation Authority (LTA) and the Ministry of Works,
Transportation, and Infrastructure (WTI) departments would not attend climate related meetings,
but this has changed because they now feel ownership of projects that incorporate climate
considerations (Interview 6B, 9 July 2018).
The approach is also beneficial in that it facilitates injection of additional funding
resources into existing funding gaps to bolster implementation of activities that have already
been approved, rather than creating new projects. One example of existing projects waiting for
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funding is improving inland roads. While these roads are in existing plans largely to facilitate
improved economic conditions for inland plantations, they can also serve as evacuation routes.
Thus, the project falls under the prevue of the adaptation funding. The expectation is that the
ministries and agencies will maintain the activities over the long term because they had already
been incorporated into their workplans before the Adaptation Fund and PPCR projects were
developed. Here, we see that through the process of working across scales and levels, the
implementing agencies generated new policy solutions that were not operationalized in this
context before the initiation of this MLG process.
Interviewees indicated that this programmatic and pragmatic approach is already
influencing change in that it has increased collaboration between government ministries on
project implementation—one of the measures of effective MLG. There are interactions between
the jurisdictional scale and institutional scale with efforts by the different government ministries
influencing operational rules and norms around mainstreaming adaptation in their work areas.
Finally, this example displays interactions between the jurisdictional scale and the management
scale where the local-to-national level stakeholders move from only thinking in terms of ad hoc
projects, to thinking about projects as a part of a higher-level strategy. A weaker aspect of the
introduction of the programmatic and pragmatic approach is that, while local and international
stakeholders did have some involvement in shaping this new approach, the national government
played a central role. Thus, we see the involvement across the jurisdictional scale, but not at
equal weight.
Embedded in this example of efforts to leverage MLG to support adaptation are tradeoffs. Given that projects have finite resources and time, only certain areas of MLG are utilized,
often at the expense of others. In this case, the national government heavily engaged its line
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ministries across the national level which created a sort of horizontal nested structure, but not a
vertical one. This is particularly important in countries like Samoa where the local village and
chiefly/social system structures play an important role in how initiatives are taken up and
sustained.
Safeguards. Safeguards are a tool to identify and manage externalities of adaptation projects that
could end up causing more harm than good to the people, ecosystem, or culture impacted by the
project. Both the World Bank and the Adaptation Fund have safeguard policies which are
supposed to guide project planning and implementation. Safeguards are an interesting challenge
of MLG because the funding organizations provide broad expectations for the project, and the
country implementers must interpret and apply the expectations to the projects. This challenge
requires work across the jurisdictional scale, as well as interactions between the jurisdictional
and institutional scales. It is also mediated by types of knowledge.
Inconsistencies between the World Bank and the Adaptation Fund project safeguards
caused disagreement over how certain parts of projects were conducted. This suggests that, in
practice, refinement of safeguards is necessary for them to function effectively across
jurisdictional levels. This tension is captured by one interviewee working closely on the PPCR
project,
“Safeguards and gender were put in [the project plan] and the environment and
social criteria, those were developed under the PPCR, but were used by both
projects. The PPCR also required the villages to go through the development
consent process. That is like the government safeguards, so that is very important,
but before not a lot of projects were going through this process. So, I think all the
key players now understand the importance, because also, the Adaptation Fund
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through UNDP, they do not really emphasize the importance of safeguards unlike
the World Bank, and that is a key difference because in Samoa, in a lot of
projects, safeguards are the issues. And the reason why some partners insist on
their procedures is because they see a gap in the national [procedure]” (Interview
3, 18 July 2018).
Interviewees put forward that Samoa is working to integrate the World Bank’s safeguards into
government procedures regardless of the funding source. This example of nested governance
levels shows that the national level has observed and experienced a process developed at the
supra-national level and sees a path to borrow that process to improve their governance
procedures. Further, from the World Bank level, they are implementing a new approach to align
safeguards with country priorities. An interviewee said that in a recent workshop, the World
Bank presented a new framework which will prioritize “find[ing] a common approach with the
government before, and agree on that approach, before [the project] gets implemented”
(Interview 1, 20 July 2018). Again, a demonstration of how the levels have nested to improve
overall governance.
However, this example again raises the question of power across the levels. While the
national level appears to be reclaiming power over this process by adopting the World Bank
safeguards on their own terms, the involvement of the sub-national level is variable. In some
instances, the safeguard process did work to support the local level, from the perspective of the
interviewees. For example, for all roads tar sealed by the government, the World Bank required
the government to compensate people living on, or farming, land immediately adjacent to the
roadwork, regardless of who actually owned the land. This certainly provided more protection
for people than they would have received if the World Bank was not involved. However, the
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funds to pay these costs cannot come out of the project budget, they must come out of the
government budget which causes the safeguards to be a strain on government resources. While
interviewees reported that the government followed through on these payments, it is worth
noting that there is less incentive to do so when the funds must be additional to the international
funding allocated in the project. This is an instance where the different levels of rules and norms
along the institutional scale can create barriers to following the safeguards.
In another case, a project under the Adaptation Fund built a revetment wall along a river
which caused more flooding instead of preventing it. The wall was developed in its present
location because of requests from the village leaders against the recommendation of engineers.
This represents a lack of communication across the knowledge scale—perhaps with more
discussion the village leaders’ experienced and contextual knowledge could have been integrated
with the analysis of the geography to come up with an output that would have worked. This
points to a need to increase the involvement of all scales in this aspect of the projects.
Additionally, the level to which these issues are reported back up to the international
jurisdictional level is not clear. If safeguard issues are underreported, it gives a different
perception on the effectiveness of safeguards as you move across the jurisdictional levels, which
does not foster nested levels of governance.
Resources. Three types of interconnected resources were highlighted by interviewees:
operational costs, staff, and institutional memory. We observe a juxtaposition between the influx
of funding from the international level, and the expectation by the international level of
additional resources at the national and local jurisdictional levels that may or may not exist. In
the case of the PPCR project, one interviewee explained that the World Bank provides the funds
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for the project, but not the operational costs. The expectation is that the country shows its
commitment to the project through supporting these operational costs which range from work
computers to the payments for using land to improve roads as discussed in the safeguards
section.
This raised a particular challenge in Samoa because the CIM plans required that ministry
officials and consultants travel to every village in the country. But, to pay visits to villages means
that they must practice “the cultural protocol which is very expensive. And those are not funded
by the projects” (Interview 3, 18 July 2018). The interviewee suggested that the number of
village consultations correlated with the funding that the government ministries could put
forward to pay for the gifts and activities integral to the cultural protocol. This represents a
blockage between the jurisdictional levels and the institutional levels where universal rules
generated at the international level do not allow countries to use funding for what can be a
critical part of the project process. This primary blockage also creates secondary issues like
unequal power across levels because the national and the local had limited interactions given
logical barriers.
One of the most popular lines among the consultants and ministry officials interviewed
was that, in their one job, they wear about twelve different ‘hats.’ There are simply a limited
number of qualified and/or experienced staff in the relevant agencies, and resources are also
limited. Thus, staff working directly on climate adaptation are required to serve in a multitude of
other capacities. This impacts the effectiveness of MLG because it is hard to be intentional about
integrating new approaches and coordination when staff are already overworked. One
interviewee explained,
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“I can’t think about replication. So, it is nothing to do with the capacity of our people to
be able to do it. It has to do with the fact that it is overwhelming. You have a hat on and
say you have twelve [hats] already, then you are asked to do this pragmatic approach
because we are looking at replicating” (Interview 6B, 9 July 2018).
This same interviewee underscored the imperative of the pragmatic approach, but simply
cautioned that implementation is challenging with limited personnel.
An interlinked challenge is that of institutional memory. Not only are the staff hard to
find, but in the case of the Adaptation Fund project, they were transient. At the time of the
project’s terminal evaluation, only one ministry official who started with the project when the
original Adaptation Fund proposal was drafted, was still on the team. An observer of the project
noted that it is hard to effectively facilitate work across the jurisdictional levels—not to mention
build higher-level strategy (management scale), work across types of knowledge, and align
timescales—when staff are constantly changing (Interview 5, 18 July 2018). The observer
continued by noting that this is a frequent challenge in internationally-funded climate projects
across the board. Not only is institutional memory missing within projects, but it is often almost
non-existent across large projects especially when they involve different sectoral partners. Thus,
these resource barriers to effective MLG might be more broadly applicable across climate
projects.
Aligning timelines. The implementing agencies did not effectively use MGL to manage the
different project timetables for the Adaptation Fund and the PPCR, respectively. This challenge
traverses the management, temporal, jurisdictional and institutional scales. According to several
interviewees, the ministries decided to link up the Adaptation Fund project and the PPCR project
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once they were both approved. The initial challenge this created was that the PPCR project was
approved later and thus had more administrative matters to address before beginning
implementation. Those implementing PPCR also noted that the World Bank requires more
administrative reporting throughout the duration of the project. Conversely, the Adaptation Fund
provided those implementing the Adaptation Fund project with the flexibility to change decisions
during implementation without prior approval from the Fund. Given these different processes,
the Adaptation Fund implementation was put on hold while the PPCR carried out its preparatory
phase. This highlights that there was, from the start, intentionality to connect the projects linking
up many different stakeholders and structures across scales. However, this connectivity became a
problem when the Adaptation Fund Secretariat, according to interviewees, contacted the
implementers to say that if they did not start implementation, they would lose the funding. So,
while the in-country teams were working to align the workplan across the many different scales,
this was prevented by international institutions’ temporal expectations.
This announcement caused the Adaptation Fund project team to uncouple the sister
projects, which removed the explicit alignment of the temporal and management scales. Hence,
the project timelines were disconnected, and so, to some degree, were the project strategies. One
observer of the Adaptation Fund project noted that this is, in their opinion, one of the most
remarkable aspects of the project—that such rapid directional change was possible (Interview 5,
18 July 2018). While the separation process may have been impressive, it also resulted in some
substantial challenges. Most importantly, since the Adaptation Fund still wanted to conduct the
CIM planning in line with the PPCR, they started the implementation step with the infrastructure
projects based off the 2002-2005 CIM plans, and then updated the plans after the projects were at
least partially carried out. In the case of the CSSP projects for the Adaptation Fund, all the
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villages in Savai’i also ended up applying for projects without an updated CIM plan on which to
base their project proposals. The Adaptation Fund implementers said that, while it was not ideal,
they had no choice if they wanted the CIM planning to be effective countrywide and finish by
the Adaptation Fund’s deadline, even with a granted extension. Observations suggest that the
implementation was also rushed which may connect closely with the safeguard challenges
discussed above. Thus, the clash of the temporal scale with the institutional and jurisdictional
scales significantly impacted the efficacy of the project process.
Stakeholder participation in the decision-making process. It is well documented in the
literature that top-down development projects continuously fail to give critical stakeholders a
seat at the table (Adams 2009). The Adaptation Fund was charged with shifting this paradigm by
being a Fund that would be responsive to the voices of the ‘vulnerable’ people it was set up to
serve. In terms of MLG, this means that the Adaptation Fund is structured for movement of
power to the supra-national and sub-national levels. In Samoa’s project proposal to the
Adaptation Fund, the national government laid out their plan to engage local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in the planning and implementation process. Namely, NGOs would be
brought on board to work with communities to develop, apply for, and implement their CSSP
projects. However, due to the shortened timeline and lack of resources for the NGO trainings, the
NGOs were not involved in the project in favor of ministry staff putting on another hat to advice
the villages. This exemplifies how limited time and resources snowball into a stakeholder’s
exclusion from the project which leads to forgoing a key characteristic of effective MLG which
is the inclusion of both state and non-state actors. It should be noted that NGOs were engaged
with the PPCR project in a limited capacity.
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Observations suggest that the Adaptation Fund and PPCR planning and implementation
was dominated by the national level ministries. The projects seem to have done an exemplary job
engaging ministries across the government to support different elements of the project including
housing and implementing many elements of both the Adaptation Fund project and the PPCR
project. As one interviewee explained, “So apart from the community consultations, we also did
site assessments with the technical experts that were on the team. So, we had an ecosystem
specialist, a civil engineer, a spatial risk planner, a geomorphologist, and plus the representatives
from implementing entities like LTA, SWA, MWTI, MNRE, and the Ministry of Women”
(Interview 2, 18 July 2018). Village leaders had direct opportunities to run projects through the
CSSP portion of the programs which proved to be a useful way to create ongoing conversation
between the government ministries and the villages beyond the CIM plan consultations.
However, the villages did not receive full autonomy over the project namely because they were
not given the grant in money and the discretion on how to spend it; rather, they were provided
the physical materials only. According to Stephenson (2013), in an effective MLG arrangement
“no level of activity [is] superior to the other.” The case in Samoa reflects a clear imbalance.
Discussion
Characteristics of MLG
This chapter sets out to test the extent to which eight characteristics of effective MLG, as
described in the literature, are evident as stakeholders maneuver across levels and scales to
implement internationally-funded climate change adaptation projects in Samoa. This is of
particular interest because, in cases of international funding flowing to national governments
who implement projects at the local level, multiple levels of governance are inherent in the
project governance process. However, the extent to which stakeholders recognize and actively
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work to facilitate MLG is not predetermined and may play an important role in how effectively
these forms of adaptation are managed.
The eight characteristics of MLG are evident in this case study to varied degrees. In a
broad sense, there was an intentional effort by the Adaptation Fund and PPCR implementers to
work within the MLG framework baked into the projects. Similarly, the implementers embraced
the fluid nature of MLG especially in managing the different project timelines.
Despite the inherent multi-jurisdictional level interactions built into an internationallyfunded adaptation project, the national government holds much of the control over both the
Adaptation Fund and PPCR projects. The national government did work closely with supranational entities such as the World Bank, the Adaptation Fund, and the UNDP. Especially in the
case of the World Bank, the national government gave power to these organizations to vet each
step of the project process including small logistical changes. Power was shared with the local
level to a lesser extent. Villages were consulted as a part of the CIM planning process and had
the opportunity to apply for and implement CSSP projects. However, both these aspects of the
projects were closely overseen by the national government at every step. The interviewees
summarize that the ministries saw the villages as dependent on them for support, but the
ministries did not feel a mutual sense of dependency on the villages. This mutual dependency,
which leads to more flattened power structures, is a tenant of Stephenson’s (2013) understanding
of MLG. This example highlights that the characteristic of equal power across levels did not
manifest in these projects.
Returning to Keskitalo’s (2010) understanding of MLG, both private and public entities
are supposed to be involved at every level. At the international to national levels, we do see a
mix of interactions between the World Bank, the UNDP, the Adaptation Fund, and the
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government ministries. However, as highlighted by the discussion of stakeholders engaged in the
projects, there is less collaboration between state and non-state actors in-country. Further
integrating Samoan civil society, in the form of NGOs and village leadership groups, into the
project process could enhance their engagement with this characteristic of MLG.
In terms of engaging across all scales, the introduction of the programmatic and
pragmatic approach is an example where the project does work across multiple scales (i.e.,
jurisdictional, temporal, institutional, and management). Yet, the approach does not necessarily
integrate levels across the knowledge scale. Given village members and leaders’ deep, contextual
knowledge of the islands, this is a critical scale to include in the Samoan context. Thus, while we
do observe continuous efforts to work across scales, it is apparent that resource and time
constraints moderate the ability to do so.
Cash et al. (2006) suggests that, when effective, MLG should create opportunities for new
policy solutions that were not possible before the levels and scales started working both
interdependently and independently (Cole 2011). In Samoa, the introduction of the pragmatic
and programmatic approach represents the most significant structural change inspired by these
projects. Moving away from the approach that deals with all internationally-funded projects in a
vacuum towards one that integrates the use of international funds with existing ministry projects
and priorities will likely have a long-term impact on Samoa’s approach to international
development finance. Further, two of the implementers also explained that they were
encouraging communities to use the new CIM plans to hold their elected officials accountable.
Villages should request that their elected officials use the plan to form their policy positions in
the Legislative Assembly. They explained that this could be one of the most effective paths to
ensure long term usage of the CIM plans. If the CIM plans become a tool for villages to increase
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climate resilience through legislative actions this would represent another policy solution born
out of the MLG process. Thus, while there were barriers to leveraging MLG for effective
adaptation, we still see substantial policy impact coming out of these two sister projects.
Conclusion
MLG, polycentric governance, and nested governance have been discussed in the
literature for over 25 years (Stephenson 2013). Yet, this case shows that despite the attention,
implementation of MLG is challenging and there is no clear playbook for how to do it well. In
Samoa, we see that the obstacles to carry out effective MLG are generated at various levels and
scales with no particular actor or area serving as the central source of the issues. Interviewees
suggested that, over the course of the projects, they were increasingly aware of the value of
working across the levels and scales.
However, the analysis also suggests that even when project implementers embrace MLG,
not all characteristics of MLG are apparent in each element of the project nor does each element
of the project include cross-level and scale interactions. This illuminates the spectrum and
quantities of trade-offs embedded in this systems approach to project management and
governance. In fact, it brings into questions when, if ever, MLG aligned with all of the
characteristics is possible. In the case of Samoa, decisions to work across all jurisdictional levels
were constantly modified by access to resources and time. Thus, project implementers had to
decide when to engage with the sub-national level entities rather than having a more nested
governance approach. Since there are so many variables embedded in this systems approach,
they cannot all be maximized at the same time. This chapter finds that effective MLG also
requires an awareness of these diverse trade-offs throughout the governance process.
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As Pacific island countries continue to apply for and receive international funding for
climate adaptation, embracing MLG and understanding the trade-offs woven into the system can
be informative in both the planning and project implementation phases. At the same time, it is
critical that project funders place value in the characteristics of effective MLG and aim to
support them through institutional policies and procedures. In particular, ministries responsible
for writing project proposals ought to work with key stakeholders to build interactions between
levels and scales into project proposals to set the project on a trajectory to be inclusive, strategic,
and in-line with broader sustainable development goals. For example, providing funding for
cultural protocols in the grants could enable more sustainable relationships between a national
government and communities. At the implementation phase, project implementers need
sufficient time to build relationships across scales and levels in order to see the programmatic
and pragmatic approach to fruition. These are critical points for project funders to embrace.
Tracking future adaptation projects in Samoa to see how they build on or diverge from
the project efforts described in this chapter as well as revisiting the Adaptation Fund and PPCR
project elements in future years would be instructive to understand the extent to which MLG
actually influenced the long-term sustainability of the projects. Further, an analysis of climate
adaptation projects in other Pacific island countries, similar to the work throughout this book,
will increase our understanding of the tools that are essential for effective climate adaptation in
the Pacific context—essential knowledge for a region on the front lines of climate change
impacts.
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CHAPTER 4
ADAPTING TO FLOODING AND DROUGHT IN NICARAGUA’S DRY CORRIDOR: A
STUDY OF NICARAGUA’S ADAPTATION FUND PROJECT
Introduction
The Adaptation Fund Board approved Nicaragua’s proposal, Reduction of Risk and
Vulnerability Based on Flooding and Drought in the Estero Real Watershed in December 2010.
The initiative joined just eight other projects as the first set of activities under the newly
operationalized Adaptation Fund. The projects were geographically dispersed and topically
diverse including one other Central American project focused on urban water resources in
Honduras, a project in Tanzania on coastal adaptation, a project in Pakistan focused on reducing
the risks of glacial lake outburst floods, and a project in the Solomon Islands centered on
agriculture and food security.
Since the inception of this first batch of projects, the Adaptation Fund has experienced
intense interest from developing countries. The most recent Adaptation Fund Board meeting, in
March 2019, received a record of 40 proposals totaling US$ 268.2 million which reflects the
demand on the Fund (AFB Press Release 2019). Prior to March 2019, the highest monetary
requests to the Fund were US$264 million in October 2018 and US$208.5 million in 2016 (AFB
Press Release 2019). These requests for funding far exceed the US$10-60 million that the Fund
has allocated at each quarterly meeting from June 2014 and July 2018 (Grimm et al. 2018).
Given the Fund’s popularity and influence, it is critical to understand both the process
and outcome of past project implementation, so newer waves of projects can learn from and
build upon past Fund experiences. In order to contribute to this endeavor, this article explores
aspects of the Nicaragua project with a particular focus on understanding stakeholders’
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perceptions of the project’s impact and learning to what extent the project catalyzed further
adaptation efforts in the region as planned in the project proposal. Since the majority of
Adaptation Fund projects are still in process, the completed Nicaragua project provides a first
sense of post-project sustainability.
Nicaragua Adaptation Fund project background
Nicaragua’s Adaptation Fund project took place in the northwestern part of the country’s
dry corridor. The project ran from 2010-2015, and project elements spanned three municipalities:
El Sauce and Achuapa in the department of León and Villanueva in the department of
Chinandega (Figure 4). Each of these municipalities, which are made up of small towns
surrounded by farming communities and forest, are situated in the Estero Real watershed—a
critical source of water for the region that is also vulnerable to flooding. According to
Nicaragua’s project proposal, “During the rainy season, landslides in the middle watershed and
heavy flooding in the middle and lower watershed are common, aggravated by extreme events
such as hurricanes or storms, causing heavy losses in harvests, human lives, domestic animals,
damage to infrastructure and a progressive deterioration of local economies” (Adaptation
Fund/MARENA nd).
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Figure 4: Central American Dry Corridor: Legend reads “Levels of dryness green- low, yellow- high, red-severe.”
The region discussed in this paper is within the light blue box (FAO 2012 from Briones 2017).

Project activities differed in each of the municipalities based on their geographic situation
within the watershed. The major project in El Sauce was the installation of two communal
irrigation systems which serve about 100 subsistence farms (Adaptation Fund 2014). The
municipal leaders in charge of implementing the project also worked with farmers to develop
Farm Agro-ecological Transformation Plans (FATP) which include adaptation actions that
farmers agreed to integrate into their farming practices. In Villanueva, to address concerns about
flooding, the project focused on building water retention ponds and reforestation. They also
worked with farmers to develop FATPs.
Achuapa is located at a higher elevation than El Sauce and Villanueva, so the focus in
that municipality is on reforestation and forest management to enhance the land’s ability to
absorb and retain rainfall. They also installed or retrofitted several rainwater catchment and
storage tanks to increase longer-term access to water during droughts. Across municipalities, the
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project aimed to enhance regional climate data collection, so at least one weather station was
installed in each municipality.
Research methods
This case study is based on in-country fieldwork, a review of project documents, and
research at United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences
of the Parties (COPs). The first phase of the research was observing adaptation negotiations at
COP21 (Paris 2015) and COP22 (Marrakech 2016). These observations informed generation of
research questions about Adaptation Fund projects taking place on-the-ground. I conducted
fieldwork in Nicaragua in July-August 2017. Initially, I intended to spend the full three week trip
with stakeholders involved in the Adaptation Fund project, but after four months of emails and
phone calls with Nicaraguan NGOs, the UNDP, universities, and other entities in the country, I
was not able to find anyone familiar with the Adaptation Fund project.
As a result, our 3-person team shifted our research plans, and spent each day with NGOs
that incorporate climate adaptation into their portfolios to learn about their projects taking place
in the same regions as the Adaptation Fund project. We interviewed university professors (n=2)
based in Managua who study adaptation; NGO leaders (n=14) based in Nagarote, El Tololar,
León, Estelí, and Totogalpa whose organizations are focused on climate adaptation; and
community members (n=14) involved with the NGOs’ adaptation projects. These interviews
informed our understanding of (1) how the NGOs’ projects are implemented, (2) the ways
groups measure how projects increase resilience to flooding and drought, and (3) the extent to
which NGOs are connected to one another and to other entities working on adaptation across the
country. We also visited adaptation project sites to learn about the intricacies of project
implementation, maintenance, obstacles, and long-term sustainability. Through connections we
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made once in Nicaragua, we were also able to interview municipal leaders in Achuapa (n=2) who
led implementation of the Adaptation Fund project in that area, and we visited various sites
where the project was carried out.
The resulting research outputs do not aim to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the
Adaptation Fund project, but rather, a contribution to the overall understanding of climate
adaptation in Nicaragua’s dry corridor and the Adaptation Fund’s role in funding these efforts.
Multi-level governance approach
Internationally-funded climate adaptation projects inherently include multiple levels of
governance because funding comes from the international level, the project is usually managed at
the national level, and the implementation takes place at the local level with reporting
requirements at the international level. However, the existence of these levels in the project
process, does not predetermine that they will work in conjunction with each other. Rather,
project implementers must actively work to build a multi-level governance approach to
maximize on these pre-existing conditions. This article uses the lens of multi-level governance to
explore the implementation of climate adaptation projects in Nicaragua.
Takeaways from Nicaragua’s Adaptation Fund project
Studying the Adaptation Fund across governance levels from country statements made at
the UNFCCC negotiations to the perspectives of municipal leaders in Achuapa, Nicaragua, we
find that the processes and projects are multi-faceted, making the possibility of declaring a
project a success or failure tenuous and more likely irrelevant. The following analysis highlights
aspects of the nuanced experiences of project implementation in Nicaragua as described by
stakeholders and observed by our research team. We find that inconsistent support across
governance levels (Adaptation Fund—national government and UNDP—municipal government)
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and lack of connectivity with existing in-country resources (namely NGOs) may have limited the
effectiveness of the project. Local officials in Achuapa did report an ongoing focus on climate
adaptation as a result of involvement in the Adaptation Fund project. This indicates that, at least
in Achuapa, the community leaders have an elevated sense of awareness about climate impacts
and have some tools to draw on when evaluating potential adaptation actions.
Unpacking local level implementation
The Ministry of Environment (MARENA) and the UNDP proposed and received funding
for the Nicaragua Adaptation Fund project. The UNDP served as the multilateral implementing
entity and MARENA acted as the executing entity. However, it is important to note that towards
the end of project implementation, all UNDP offices and personnel were asked to leave
Nicaragua by the national government citing “political interference” (Chamorro 2016). So, while
UNDP has early involvement in the project, by the end they had to drop involvement and leave
the country. This points to an overarching lack of coordination across governance levels
extending far beyond this Adaptation Fund project.
While I did not have the opportunity to meet with national government officials or the
UNDP, their role in implementation seemed limited notwithstanding the conflict described
above. By contrast, the municipal leaders held the bulk of responsibility for project
implementation. The Adaptation Fund’s Portfolio Monitoring Mission to Nicaragua confirms
this understanding, stating repeatedly that, “In the case of Nicaragua, the decentralization of the
implementation of the programme was very noticeable” (AFB/EFC 2014, 26). This
decentralization of the project, also referenced as “the devolution of responsibilities to the local
level” (AFB/EFC 2014, 2), illuminates some of the primary reasons behind both the project’s
limited successes as well as the overarching challenges.
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Development scholars largely agree that while the “devolution of responsibility” does
represent a trend toward shared governance and co-management, it often fails to adequately shift
power and resources to the local level (Elyachar 2005). Thus, local leaders and community
members are expected, in this case, to bear the responsibility for adaptation outcomes without all
the tools to do so. In the case of Achuapa, municipal leaders did not know that the Adaptation
Fund project existed until after the Adaptation Fund approved the project proposal. While the
municipal leaders reported that they were pleasantly surprised by the influx of resources when
informed that MARENA selected their municipality as a sight of implementation, it was a
significant addition to their municipal work load. Additionally, they never received the actual
funds to carry out the project, rather they were sent experts and materials. The control of the
money and the decision on the types of adaptation activities to be implemented stayed at the
national level.
When municipalities do not have the capacity or resources to manage adaptation projects
alone, we see the devolution of responsibility down to the individual level. For example, Maria, a
rancher in Achuapa, shared that, as a part of the Adaptation Fund project, municipal leaders
asked that she be the sole person responsible for protecting the massive swath of forest adjacent
to her home. Cutting had been prohibited on that area of land, and Maria had been charged with
enforcing this rule. Maria said that while she “has always wanted to keep that area forested,” it is
a major challenge to make sure people from town do not come and cut down trees (Interview,
2017). In this case, the long-term sustainability of the Adaptation Fund’s forest management and
reforestation effort in this particular forest rests on the shoulders of one rancher.
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On community participation
This is not to say that community engagement with adaptation projects is not essential. In
fact, quite the opposite. Communities are central to the whole process. While Maria, the rancher
described above, was given significant responsibilities as part of the Adaptation Fund project,
she and other community members were not actively engaged in the project planning. As one of
the Achuapa municipal leaders described, “Because a lot of the construction activities were
planned in Managua, and the culture and characteristics of the people weren’t taken into
account…They contributed something, but people didn’t want it. It didn’t serve their needs…but
people assimilated well” (Interview 2017). Not only were the community members unaware of
the project, but the municipal leaders did not know about it either. The municipal leaders
described to us, “[the national government] didn’t consult anyone in formulating the project.
Because once it was planned and approved, they came here to promote it, but they already
bought the technology, the activities were already established” (Interview 2017). So, while the
local leaders and community were given significant responsibility during implementation, they
did not have a say in the project priorities, the ways to address the priorities, or the desired
outcomes.
Our observations suggest that the municipal leaders in Achuapa embraced the project,
despite their exclusion during the planning phase, and took ownership of making the efforts
successful. They ran community meetings, created committees, and paid visits to people’s homes
to discuss elements of the project and check in after implementation (Interview 2017). Maria, the
rancher, said that she had full trust in the municipal leaders (Interview 2017). However, evidence
suggests that the project could have been more successful if not just responsibility, but also
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resources and decision-making authority had been placed with the local community (Elyachar
2005).
At the local level, there was a significant attempt to embrace a community approach to
adaptation during implementation and ongoing monitoring, such as forest management, despite
MARENA and UNDP’s original approach. The important question to ask is, do we understand
this community involvement as success in the eyes of the Adaptation Fund? While the national
government is the executing entity on paper, if the responsibility for executing the entire project
will ultimately be devolved to other stakeholders, those stakeholders’ involvement in all stages
of the Adaptation Fund project seems critical.
On NGOs
In 1990, the ruling party, the FSLN, held presidential elections. In the lead up to the 1990
election, the opposition put together a coalition to run against Daniel Ortega, the FSLN leader
and president. Violeta Chamorro won the election unseating the FSLN and their socialist goals.
The Chamorro administration championed neoliberal reform carrying Nicaragua into new era of
politics and economics. These neoliberal ideas were carried on by her successors Arnoldo
Alemán (1997-2002) and Enrique Bolaños (2002-2007)5. Starting in 1990, Nicaragua saw the
proliferation of NGOs across the country—from 300 groups in 1990 to 2,000 in 2005 (Chahim
and Prakash 2014). Scholars refer to this phenomenon as the “NGOization of civil society”
(Chahim and Prakash 2014, 493). This is not coincidental, but rather a symptom of reduced
government services.
Over the next decade, more and more foreign funding started to flow through these
NGOs rather than as assistance to the national government meaning that NGOs increasingly

5

For more information on Nicaragua’s political and economic history from 1890-present, see Appendix 2.
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provided services for the Nicaraguan people. As such, many NGOs in Nicaragua are now paying
close attention to climate change as a prominent funding stream and an area of significant
concern, especially in the dry corridor.
Despite their abundance, there were no NGOs involved with the Nicaragua Adaptation
Fund project, and, of the five NGOs we met with and an additional seven that I spoke with over
the phone and via email, none of the organizations were aware of the Adaptation Fund project.
This is not to suggest that project responsibility should have been further devolved from
municipalities to local NGOs, but rather that NGOs in the region have significant experience
implementing similar projects; and therefore, could have played a supporting role and perhaps
helped to further develop municipal capacity to carry out climate adaptation work.
For example, in the mid-term evaluation of the Adaptation Fund project, one of the
concerns about the project was its use of irrigation by aspersion, also known as spray irrigation.
The report suggests that not only do farmers “begin their irrigation in the morning and leave the
water spraying through the hot part of the morning” which is inefficient because most of the
water evaporates, but the system also increases “inequitable distribution of water in that the new
access points appear to only benefit those who are nearest to the water distribution systems”
(Ryan 2014, 46). This maladaptive practice introduced by the Adaptation Fund project may well
have been avoided if NGOs had been involved. This is likely because all five NGOs we visited
worked exclusively with drip irrigation, in light of the more intense droughts, because of its
efficient use of water. One NGO had an experimental farm where they tested different methods
of water-efficient irrigation to figure out what works best for different plants and under different
precipitation and temperature conditions. The results of this nearby project could have informed
irrigation decisions made for the Adaptation Fund project if these connections were cultivated.
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Similarly, another concern from the Achuapa municipal leaders was that the Adaptation
Fund project component on collecting weather data—especially rainfall amounts—did not ensure
accurate, or even useful, data. They suggested this was because of the lack of systematic
monitoring of manual precipitation gauges. Again, many of the NGOs in the region are also
collecting climate data and are working with a national effort run by the science hub, Centro
Humboldt, to collect these data and then disseminate analysis back out to farmers via Whatsapp.
While the municipal governments have their own access to government data, additionally
tapping into this existing network could have made the Adaptation Fund projects’ data collection
efforts more usable for the area’s farmers and conserved resources by connecting with preexisting networks.
Two leaders of one of the NGOs accompanied us on our visit to Achuapa because they
were just as interested as we were to learn about their neighboring municipality’s climate
adaptation initiatives. Their reaction upon leaving Achuapa was, “me quedaron con dudas”
which translates to, it leaves me with doubts (Interview 2017). When asked to elaborate, one of
the NGO leaders described that they have done similar work with agriculture and reforestation
with sustained funding for the past 10 years, and the work is still ongoing. It is a huge challenge
to make a difference with only 5 years of funding (Interview 2017). This perspective is not
surprising, and has been well studied, but it is a reminder that the long-term sustainability of the
project needs to be planned from the beginning. One significant way that Achuapa attempted to
do this was dedicating 5% of their annual municipal budget to environmental work. During our
visit, about two years after the Adaptation Fund project funding ended, it was evident that they
were still trying to sustain the project but were juggling many other priorities as well. It is critical
that the municipal governments build their capacity to manage climate adaptation, and it would
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be valuable to explore further how existing NGOs with an adaptation focus can support this
institutional capacity building effort.
Adaptation Fund project as a catalyst for further adaptation in the region?
The Adaptation Fund intentionally funds small, concrete adaptation projects which are
often seen as pilot initiatives that can be replicated, if effective. The Adaptation Fund’s Portfolio
Monitoring Mission to Nicaragua makes this clear in their report:
The scale of the problem…is evidently too vast to be overcome fully through a projectbased intervention of the scale funded through the Adaptation Fund. The interventions,
accordingly, seek to demonstrate pilot solutions with immediate benefits for highly
vulnerable communities. Attention must subsequently focus on how these are financially
sustained and scaled out to other vulnerable communities with additional financial
resources (AFB/EFC 2014, 2).
A central challenge in the “highly decentralized” Nicaragua case is how to replicate the project
when most of the knowledge on implementation rests with the municipal leaders. This is
especially problematic because, as one of the Achuapa leaders stated, “whenever a project like
this is finished, it is the municipality’s responsibility to monitor the results. Not to replicate it”
(Interview 2017). Thus, MARENA could replicate the type of project in another area, but they
likely lack critical information about experienced successes and pitfalls known only by the local
implementers.
Further, implementers stated that there is no existing network or mechanism for them to
disseminate information about the project to municipalities working on adaptation in other
regions. Their lack of connections with NGOs means that the experience of the project will not
feed into any NGO’s future project planning either. In this way, more attention to multi-level
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governance—support moving back and forth between the local and the national governments—
and less dependence on “devolution of responsibility” could have increased the likelihood that
lessons learned will influence other adaptation efforts taking place in Nicaragua.
Conclusion
Local, but isolated, impact
This Adaptation Fund project set climate adaptation planning at the center of Achuapa’s
municipal conversation and decision making for five years. As a result of the project, they have
now dedicated 5% of their annual budget to environmental work, and they have built
relationships throughout the community around efforts to decrease negative impacts of flooding
and drought. The project ballooned conversations and planning about forest management that is
compatible with agricultural livelihoods (Interview 2017). In these ways, the Adaptation Fund
funding did promote climate adaptation at the local level—its intended goal.
Yet, the sections above outline the ways in which the project structure and governance
reduced the project’s overall effectiveness and scalability. In this project, as with many
Adaptation Fund projects, the national government serves as the linchpin between the funding
agency and the actual project stakeholders. Given that the national government is inherently
essential to the project, the idea of multi-level governance which is that each level of governance
is constantly interacting and supporting the work at the other levels (Cole 2011) ought to be
encouraged over project decentralization which seems to have largely removed the national
government from responsibility of ensuring that the project supported communities in adapting
to the impacts of climate change.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Additional analysis of multi-level governance in Samoa
Chapter 3 included analysis of five elements of the Adaptation Fund and PPCR projects
to unpack the ways in which MLG was facilitating adaptation and where it was not leveraged to
support the projects. Below, I provide four additional examples to supplement this discussion if
the reader is interested in further analysis of the Samoan adaptation projects.
Regional organizations
Much of the analysis of MLG is situated around the jurisdictional scale because it houses
the governing entities. Thus, it is important to state upfront that the supra-national organizations
that connect many of the SIDS in the Pacific region are largely absent from both these adaptation
projects. The Pacific region has a substantial network of regional organizations including the
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) which is the
intergovernmental environmental organization. While SPREP and other regional organizations
are charged with providing support to countries working on sustainable development, they were
noticeably missing from conversations on adaptation in Samoa. Individuals involved with the
adaptation projects expressed that the national level is often working to build the capacity of the
regional organizations instead of the inverse. One interviewee describes that the only role that
SPREP played was in receiving support from Samoa, “so this thing about regional going in to
help, it was us from PPCR Samoa who built capacity of the regional. I thought this was very
interesting because the whole PPCR experience on the national side was actually being taking
into the regional” (Interview 6B, 9 July 2018). MLG is supposed to work multi-directionally
creating a nested structure where levels simultaneously working with independence and
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interdependence (Cole 2011) Here, the obstacle is that the national level is supporting the
regional without reciprocation.
There is significant potential in SPREP to be a National Implementing Entities (NIE) to
the Adaptation Fund and other funds like the Green Climate Fund for Samoa and other pacific
countries. However, one interviewee explained, “countries go for the fund that has the proven
track record rather than going for something new…Yes, SPREP is more in tune with countries,
as opposed to other regional organizations, but as an executing agency, they are having teething
problems. We don’t need that. Countries don’t need an executing agency or an implementing
agency coming in with problems” (Interview 6B, 9 July 2018). It seems that SPREP would need
to increase involvement in these projects to continue to draw institutional capacity from the
national level because, at present, they are the missing link in the MLG structure for climate
adaptation. Where SPREP could add substantial value is in transferring project knowledge and
lessons learned across its member states creating more connectivity across the spatial scale.
Nature-based solutions
Nature-based solutions are adaptations that employ nature to improve the resilience of
both the natural and human systems. While the Adaptation Fund and PPCR adaptation projects
were largely focused on engineered solutions from rainwater harvesting and storage systems to
roads and bridges, a few projects started to engage with the concept of nature-based solutions
(Interview 2, 18 July 2018). These efforts included planting trees along critical inland water
catchment areas, rehabilitating mangrove reserves, and a marine protected area. An interviewee
outlined one of the most promising nature-based solution adaptation projects implemented under
the PPCR,
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“We have a project in Savai’i…on Mount Sili, the highest peak, so if we do this project
we would stop any more sealing of the road that goes up so that people will continue to
hike, and also we are looking at invasive species as an indicator of climate change
impacts, because…from previous projects, I know that climate change also changes
vegetation and given that it is Samoa’s largest peak and it’s got the cloud forest and all
that, we have a proposal to protect the area and we intend to have a permanent
monitoring vegetation plot so MNRE can monitor and see changes. But that is a longterm thing, but we think it is good to set it up now and then link it up with the National
University so students can use it as a research space” (Interview 2, 18 July 2018).
In this description, the interviewee highlights that these projects necessitate longer timescales.
Unlike paving a road which happens in a matter of weeks and then the project is deemed
complete, this project to establish and maintain a protected zone on Mount Sili will be ongoing
for years.
In this way, nature-based solutions have the potential to build greater connections across
levels and scales because the interdependence occurs over a longer period of time. In addition,
this example integrates academia, a non-state actor, into the long-term project management
which expands the network of stakeholders invested in the initiative’s success. It seems that this
project may also be providing a window for this “new solution” that was not available prior to
the introduction of these projects. In these ways, we see a number of the key characteristics of
MLG. Yet, at the same time, these types of projects test the endurance of a MLG system to hold
up even after the project funding periods end.
Nature-based solutions may also provide an avenue for future adaptation work in Samoa
because these types of projects generally demand fewer financial resources. According to a
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PPCR project implementer, “the environment projects are actually less costly, they cost less than
a million…whereas the infrastructure one’s cost millions. But the long-term impact, the longterm sustainability, I see more in environment projects. But the problem with our people is that
they still want seawalls…and big structures” (Interview 2, 18 July 2018). Here, we see a clash of
the management scale and the temporal scale as the ministries grapple with the costs associated
with short versus long term benefits and how these fit into the current internationally-funded
projects as well as the country’s longer-term adaptation strategy.
Nature-based solutions to address climate impacts are an area to continue monitoring to
observe to what extent these nature-based solutions provide a path to build up sustainable and
longer lasting connections across levels and scales of governance.
Accountability
A cross-cutting challenge of MLG is which levels on what scales are held accountable for
decisions, mistakes, and acting on lessons learned. In in the case of the revetment wall described
in the safeguards section, implementer of the PPCR project expressed that there was a problem
of accountability. The implementers wanted to “appease” the village leaders to move the project
forward, so they did not engage in further consultations with the engineers and the village
leaders. When it comes to taking responsibility for the more intense flooding in the village, does
it fall on the implementers, the village leaders, the UNDP who is supposed to oversee the project,
or even on the Adaptation Fund safeguard policy? The interviewee shared that for these projects
to be sustainable over the long term, “at the end of the day, someone needs to be held
accountable (Interview 2, 18 July 2018). This issue involves the jurisdictional scale because of
the critical stakeholders at each level which are influenced by the Samoan and international
norms on the institutional scale as well as by different forms of knowledge.
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This example highlights that stakeholders operating in a MLG system are faced with
numerous trade-offs. If the national government takes highlights, and takes responsibility for the
breach of safeguards, they may be less likely to see additional international funding in the future.
Would this be to the benefit or detriment of adaptation efforts in the country overall? Or if the
village is asked to take responsibility, perhaps they will be less interested in working with the
national government and with international funds in the future.
Tourism
The Adaptation Fund and PPCR projects did successfully involve many of the country’s
ministries in the implementation and planned long-term management of the project
initiatives. An official from MNRE said that while ministries are each in a different place on
their integration of climate considerations, the most challenging area of alignment is with the
Samoan Tourism Authority (STA). Much of Samoa’s current tourism industry is based on the
coast, lagoon, and ocean. This is largely a clash of the temporal scale with the levels across the
jurisdictional scale. While some ministries are working on long planning horizons, like MNRE,
STA is looking to increase tourism opportunities in Samoa in the next five years. As a result, the
local level receives conflicting development advice from the national levels.
In response to tourism demands, villages are encouraged by STA to develop
accommodations and resources on the coast. This mentality is best described by one of the
carpenters involved in a CSSP project on Savai’i. He explained that they used the funding to
build stairs down the steep cliffs to the coast because the old stairs were dangerous, but people
want to access the grasses to weave their mats. Now that the stairs are built, though, the village
wants to develop the small area of land right on the beach to attract tourists. He suggested that
they are interested in building beach fales (open-air buildings), bathrooms, and a restaurant.
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Now, an adaptation project that was intended to help people continue their coastal livelihoods
while giving them a safe way to return to the village on higher ground has enabled a better
environment for coastal development. One interviewee shared that they are working with
villages to reconcile these seemingly competing efforts,
“We understand the nature of the industry, but…that is going to have an impact on what
we are trying to promote…We say maybe you can still develop down there, but you
ensure that there is proper access to your safe areas up there and ensure that you reside in
those safer areas, and you have your tourism areas that you come down here and operate
during the day. And we try to push to ensure that each of those villages have proper
access, escape routes.” (Interview 4, 12 July 2018).
The interviewee further describes the need to balance the interests of the villages, the
ministries, and the adaptation projects. He explains, “we cannot just totally decline the villages,
refuse the villages from building in those areas, otherwise the village will turn to the government
and say give us the money to help us out…because we can’t do that” (Interview 4, 12 July 2018).
While paying communities for the economic losses they face as a result of climate impacts is an
emerging topic especially under the UNFCCC (i.e., Loss and Damage), the Samoan government
does not see this as an economically sustainable option at this time. Working within the national
jurisdiction to reconcile temporally based development objectives might smooth MLG across the
jurisdictional levels and help the different ministries come to new policy solutions.
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Appendix 2: Brief economic and political history of Nicaragua
Chapter 4 provides a short case study of the Adaptation Fund project in Nicaragua. This
section, Appendix 2, provides additional background on Nicaragua’s economic and political
history from 1890-present because it is critical to many of the trends observed in the Nicaragua
case.
Nicaragua, located in the heart of Central America, is a country bursting with brightly
colored towns layered in murals, it is a country dotted with nineteen volcanoes running down the
Pacific coast, and it is a country known for its kindhearted people. But, Nicaragua is also a
country that has faced decades of war, it is a country where the United States has worked to tips
the scales in the US’s favor for over 150 years, it is a country grappling with rural poverty and
urban planning challenges, and it is a country this is now faced with the impacts of climate
change. Nicaragua is the largest country by area in Central America and is the poorest country in
the Western Hemisphere after Haiti (CIA World Factbook 2017).
Governance: From Zelaya to Ortega
Nicaragua has a complicated political history as a result of both domestic events and
foreign intervention. Here, we begin with Jose Santos Zelaya and walk through the major events
and leaders that continue to influence the way that Nicaragua governs and interacts with the
international community. Zelaya came to power in 1893. It was not until one year later, in 1894,
that Nicaragua gained full independence when the British moved out of Bluefields on the
Atlantic Coast (Powell 1928). Zelaya has a goal of uniting all of Central America under one
government but was met with significant challenges from both other Central American nations
and by the US. At this time, the US already had significant footholds in Nicaragua especially via
industry centered around Bluefields and the Mosquito Coast area. In 1909, because of Zelaya’s
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radical motivations to bring together all of Central America, the Mexican and US governments
forced him to step down from the presidency.
Over the next 28 years, there were 16 presidents and acting presidents of which some
served for only a week and others for years. Civil wars took place, and power struggles
abounded. The most influential icon of the era, Augusto C. Sandino, developed his ideology and
emerged as a leader during this time. Sandino, who gathered his revolutionary thinking from
inspiration in Mexico and Cuba, had a goal of “emancipating Nicaraguan workers” (Hodges
1994, 27). For Sandino, the first step was expelling US control from Nicaragua, so he embarked
on a guerilla war against the US Marine forces occupying the country. Despite Sandino’s efforts,
the US continued to push forward its agenda in Nicaragua which was to build a canal and
establish economic controls. When the US successfully propped the Somoza family into power
in 1937, one of their first acts was to have Sandino assassinated. While this act removed Sandino
himself from the country’s future, his ideology ultimately propelled the take down of the Somoza
regime 43 years later. Sandino’s legacy is still front and center in Nicaragua today.
It has been well established that the Somoza regime was a dictatorship upheld by the US
government. The US largely ignored the human rights violated of the regime because Somoza
allowed the US to exercise whatever power it desired in the country. During this time, through
the influence of Somoza, the economy transitioned to a more capitalist framework. In the
agricultural sector, the government provided subsidies to large export-oriented companies while
reducing credit available to smallholder farmers. This caused the migration of smallholder
farmers to the hillsides while industrial scale farmers took over the flatlands (Biderman 1983).
Opposition to the Somoza regime started as early as 1939. In the early 1960s, Carlos Fonseca
Amador started to break away from the main opposition group he was a part of because “he saw
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the development of a new revolutionary group which would finish the tasked started by Sandino
by mobilizing peasants and workers into a military force with a true Nica identity based on selfdetermination and nationalism” (Staten 2010). Fonseca continued on to establish the baseline
ideology of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) through his thinking and writing.
Although the economy was growing overall, almost every section of the Nicaraguan
population was discontent with the Somoza regime by the 1970s. In this context, the Sandinistas
(FSLN) developed and launched a successful overthrow of the Somoza regime which ended in
1979. This event sent shocks through the US government because their dictator had fallen. As
the Sandinistas took over, the US intensely debated how they would interact with Nicaragua
going forwards. For example, would they provide an aid package to the war-torn country or
would they apply harsh sanctions to cripple the Nicaraguan economy even further? These
concerns were not only fueled by politics within Nicaragua, but also how Nicaragua would
establish their international relations in a Cold War world. There was a distinct fear in the US
that Nicaragua could be a premiere target for another communist foothold, in addition to Cuba,
in the Western Hemisphere. Under the Carter administration, the US held a slightly more
amiable position toward the FSLN, but as soon as Reagan took over, aid was off the table (Jones
1981). The FSLN was able to obtain aid from other sources including the Soviet Union, but the
US effectively blocked other major sources where they would have been able to take out loans
for reconstruction. On top of this, it was not possible for the FSLN to focus on rebuilding
because they were still fighting the Contra Wars which were anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans, funded
by the US, fighting to take down the Sandinista government. The Contra Wars continued through
the Reagan Administration.
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During their time in power, the FSLN set up five-year presidential terms. In the lead up to
the 1990 election, the opposition put together a coalition to run against Daniel Ortega, the FSLN
leader and president. Violeta Chamorro won the election unseating the FSLN and their socialist
goals. Shocked, but pleased, the US immediate went to work to encourage Chamorro to make
certain economic and political decisions including downsizing the government in an effort to
remove as many Sandinistas as possible and to drop Nicaragua’s world court case against the US
(Brown 2000). The Chamorro administration championed neoliberal reform carrying Nicaragua
into new era of politics and economics. These neoliberal ideas were carried on by her successors
Arnoldo Alemán (1997-2002) and Enrique Bolaños (2002-2007). Daniel Ortega continued to run
in every election and after three unsuccessful bids, he won back the presidency in 2007.
Ortega has now served as Nicaragua’s president for ten years, and he was reelected in
November of 2016 to be president for another five years. Over this time, Ortega has worked to
consolidate power and has reduced the exercise of many democratic principles. While he is still
the leader of the FSLN party, the ideals of today’s Ortega would be hardly recognizable to the
FSLN that overthrew the Somoza regime in 1979. Some of the specific changes that Ortega has
made, either directly or through the courts, to the functioning of the Nicaraguan government
include ending presidential term limits in 2009, ending a Separation of Power law in 2010, and
eliminating poll observers from the voting process in 2011 (Thaler 2017). Thaler (2017) also
details a series of moves by Ortega to consolidate power of the police and military forces. In
addition to these policy and law changes, Ortega has also developed strong relationships with the
business class as well as the Catholic Church which were two major enemies of the Sandinistas
in the 1970s and 1980s. While pulling these groups in, Ortega simultaneously joined the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) and developed a particularly strong
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relationship with Venezuela. The most prominent deal secured with Venezuela is the Petrocaribe
Program which locks in Venezuela as Nicaragua oil provider, and, in return, Nicaragua agrees to
pay off the shipment in particular, pre-set installments (Thaler 2017). Thaler (2017) argues that
under Ortega Nicaragua has moved from competitive authoritarianism to more classic
authoritarianism, and Nicaragua continues to inch away from democracy with each passing event
of the Ortega Administration. It is in this historical and current context that this paper continues
by exploring the evolution of the Nicaraguan economy.
Economy: Philosophies and realities of economics in Nicaragua
Ortega is termed by Walters (2017) as having a “contradictory economic agenda” (7).
This can, in large part, be derived from the political alliances outlined above. In an effort to
pursue capitalism while also pleasing what is left of his 1970s FSLN base, Ortega has taken a
track which Walters (2017) dubs “market economy with a preferential option for the poor” (9).
However, it seems as though the market economy mentality, more than the focus on the poor,
drives the decision making of the administration. Nicaragua has established economically
dominant free trade zones where foreign multinational corporations can set up shop and work
under relaxed Nicaragua regulations with low paid Nicaraguan workers. The administration also
supports industrial agriculture via subsidies and tax breaks. It should be acknowledged that they
do also offer programs for small-scale agriculture, but the scope of these two endeavors do not
compare. Ortega has also been encouraging large-scale extractive industries to dig into
Nicaraguan gold reserves (Walters 2017). The government does have large aid programs to
address poverty in Nicaragua; however, the majority of this funding is funneled into Nicaragua
from the ALBA countries, and Venezuela in particular, so the long-term stability of this support
is questionable given the volatility in Venezuela at present.
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While not entirely illustrative of the reality on the ground, Nicaragua’s economic
statistics appear optimistic. According to UN Data (2014), Nicaragua’s GDP had increased from
US$ 8,741 million in 2010 to US$ 11,806 million in 2014. The GDP growth rate during that
time, using 2005 as a baseline, is 4.7 percent. Nicaragua’s two major economic sectors are
agriculture and industry. Agriculture grew from 17.7 percent gross value added (GVA) in 2005
to 20 percent GVA in 2014. Industry has hovered between 23 percent GVA and 25.7 percent
GVA over the past decade. Nicaragua is a net importer, and its largest trading partners as a
percent of imports are the US, China, and Mexico; the largest trading partners as a percentage of
exports are the US, Mexico, and Venezuela (UN Data 2014). Nicaragua’s top exports are
“insulated wire, knit t-shirts, coffee, gold, and frozen bovine meat” and their top imports are
“refined petroleum, packaged medicaments, crude petroleum, delivery trucks, and cars” (OEC
2015). These statistical descriptors give some sense of where the economy has been focused in
recent years. It is critical to address, however, that Nicaragua’s economy has developed
extremely unevenly. While many urban dwellers are experiencing upward mobility and the new
bourgeoisie class that has risen under Ortega is thriving, there is still chronic rural poverty across
the majority of the country.
Nicaragua’s economy has shifted significantly in style and trajectory over the country’s
modern history in large part because of its tumultuous political past. The roots of the modern-day
economy begin in the 16th century when Nicaragua was one of the focal points of the slave trade.
The number of people removed from Nicaragua to be slaves in other countries significantly
reduced the people in country who would be able to work. For this reason, people made
decisions to focus on livelihoods that required less labor, but perhaps more land, following the
Stolper-Samuelson model. This initiated the tradition of cattle farming in Nicaragua (Biderman
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1983). During this time, people also started to grow cash crops for export with a main focus on
cacao and indigo. The land tenure structure set up during this era persisted through much of
Nicaragua’s history and plays an important role in who had access to the land to grow crops. The
19th century was marked by the coffee boom which benefited the land-owning class the most.
Once Nicaragua gained full independence, one of the most substantial challenges for the
Zelaya regime was to connect the economies of the Pacific and Atlantic regions. While the
Pacific region was the more culturally connected region to the central city of Managua, the
Atlantic region was the exporting powerhouse due to the historic presence of British and US
corporate enterprises. There was general resistance to bringing together the regions at the
expense of a united economy (Healy 1981). Even in present day, there is still a cultural divide
between the Pacific and Atlantic regions of Nicaragua.
Under the Somoza regime, the economy was propelled towards the capitalist direction.
From the onset of this capitalist momentum, the development of the economy happened
unevenly (Biderman 1983). Somoza supported large agriculture through subsidies and incentives
while disregarding the needs of the smallholder farmers. The 1950s and 1960s in Nicaragua are
categorized by the cotton boom which is the major event that strengthened the divide between
the subsistence based campesinos and the owning class. First, agricultural mechanization swept
through the country, replacing workers with machines and chemicals. Second, the focus of
cultivation shifted from food to cotton, so food grown in country for domestic consumption
dropped significantly. Third, the government reduced campesinos access to credit, so they often
were forced into a position where they had to sell their land to the industrial agricultural
companies in order to have enough capital to feed their family for the next year. This
phenomenon meant that campesinos who traditionally lived on the fertile flat lands moved up the
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hillsides and on the sides of volcanoes onto land they could afford (Biderman 1983). This
distribution of people across the landscape is still evident today with the lowland dominated by
monocultures and the hillsides dotted with small farms and pervasive rural poverty.
When the Sandinistas overthrew the Somoza regime in 1979, they had a socialist,
redistributive economic agenda. But, crippling sanctions from the US hampered their ability to
move the country out of war recovery and into a functioning economy of any type. According to
Stahler-Sholk (1995),
The Sandinista development model envisioned a kind of expansionary restructuring of
the economy, centered around a state-led investment drive that was supposed to
modernize agriculture and agroindustry, raise productivity as an alternative to
intensifying the exploitation of labor, and reduce external dependence (85).
Under the FSLN, the number of unions ballooned, and the government brought just under half of
the country’s economy under state ownership (Stahler-Sholk 1995). The goal was a radically
different economic style from the Somoza era dominated by US involvement.
However, in 1990 when the Sandinistas lost the election to Chamorro, the trajectory of
the economy shifted once again back towards neoliberal, capitalist values. Baquedano et al.
(2011) explain that during the 1990s, Nicaragua focused on liberalizing the entire economy and
specifically it looked to adjust policies on agriculture to favor privatization and price
liberalization. The owning class systematically consolidated economic power in the form of
buying up smaller companies and small parcels of land. As described in the governance section,
the US favored this series of neoliberal Nicaraguan leaders and encouraged the capitalization of
the economy. This era carries us back to the present-day Ortega economy which represent some
mixing of each of these varieties of economy which came before him. While policies have
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shifted, the major thread running through an analysis of Nicaragua economy over time is that of
unequal development between the politicians and owning class and the rural campesinos
(Biderman 1983 and Thaler 2017). This divide remains one of Nicaragua’s most profound
challenges looking into the future.
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